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A SPECTRUM OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: SHIFTING 
PATTERNS OF POWER DISTRIBUTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS 
Jessica Peake* 
THERE IS A WEALTH OF SCHOLARSHIP the independent in-
fluence of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems on both 
substantive and procedural international criminal law1 and the 
tensions2 that have resulted from attempting to apply both in 
one new amalgamated procedural system in the international 
criminal law arena.3  This article seeks to embrace the influ-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* International Human Rights Law Program Manager, UCLA School of 
Law; SJD Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School 2015; LL.M 
University of Pennsylvania 2010; LL.M: Public International Law, University 
of Leiden 2009; LL.B: European, International and Comparative Law Uni-
versity of Sheffield 2007. 
1 See e.g. Kai Ambos, The Structure of International Criminal Procedure: 
“Adversarial”, “Inquisitorial” or Mixed?, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 429-503 (2011), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1972236 (last vis-
ited Jul 5, 2012); Claus Kress, The Procedural Law of the International Crim-
inal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a Unique Compromise, 1 J INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 603–17 (2003); Megan Fairlie, Marriage of Common and Continental 
Law at the ICTY and Its Progeny, Due Process Deficit, The, 4 INT’L CRIM. L. 
REV. 243 (2004); Rupert Skilbeck, Frankenstein’s Monster Creating a New 
International Procedure, 8 J INT’L CRIM. JUST. 451–62 (2010). 
2 See, e.g. Patrick L. Robinson, Rough Edges in the Alignment of Legal 
Systems in the Proceedings at the ICTY, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1037 (2005); 
Robert Christensen, Getting to Peace by Reconciling Notions of Justice: The 
Importance of Considering Discrepancies between Civil and Common Legal 
Systems in the Formation of the International Criminal Court, 6 UCLA J. 
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 391 (2001). 
3 See, e.g. Fairlie, supra note 1; Maximo Langer, Rise of Managerial 
Judging in International Criminal Law, The, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835 (2005); 
Maximo Langer & Joseph W. Doherty, Managerial Judging Goes Interna-
tional but Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the 
ICTY Reforms, 36 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 (2011); Stepha-
nos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets Domes-
tic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637 (2009); Frederic Megret, 
Beyond Fairness: Understanding the Determinants of International Criminal 
Procedure, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. FOREIGN AFF. 37 (2009); Caianiello, infra note 
1
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ence of both the adversarial and inquisitorial models of proce-
dure in the creation of international criminal procedure (ICP) 
in its modern conception as a new body of procedural law,4 yet 
to move beyond existing literature to identify a spectrum of 
ICP falling between the absolute adversarial model and abso-
lute inquisitorial model. The idea of a sliding scale between the 
two pure systems is not new,5 but this article seeks to establish 
this scale in concrete terms and to contribute to this discussion 
by plotting three of the international courts and tribunals onto 
this scale, to identify convergences, similarities and differences 
in the procedures adopted across those courts.    
As its principal claim, this article asserts that ICP is char-
acterized by a fundamental structural shift in the allocation of 
power between the actors in a criminal trial – the judges, pros-
ecution and defense - away from that traditionally ascribed un-
der an adversarial system, and towards the power distribution 
structure more common to the inquisitorial system.  By looking 
at the Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE’s) of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Ex-
traordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), it is 
possible to identify varying degrees of power shifts in each 
court. Across each we see a convergence around the transferal 
of procedural powers away from the individual parties and into 
the hands of the judge(s), shifting the power structure away 
from adversarial norms in favor of more traditional inquisitori-
al role assignments.  It also becomes evident that underlying 
these fundamental structural power shifts are several proce-
dural devices, which embrace mechanisms employed in both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204; Kress, supra note 1. 
4 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Crim-
inal Court: Introduction, Analysis and Integrated Text (1 ed. 2005); Ralph 
Zacklin, Some Major Problems in the Drafting of the ICTY Statute, 2 J Int’L 
Crim. Just. 361–67 (2004); Dermot M. Groome, Re-Evaluating the Theoretical 
Basis and Methodology of International Criminal Trials, 25 Penn St. Int’l L. 
Rev. 791 (2006); Mireille Delmas-Marty, Contribution of Comparative Law to 
a Pluralist Conception of International Criminal Law, The, 1 J. Int’l Crim. 
Just. 13 (2003); Ambos, supra note 1; Fabian O. Raimondo, General Princi-
ples of Law as Applied by International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 6 
Law & Prac. Int’l Cts. & Tribunals 393 (2007); Tsvetana Kamenova, Different 
Legal Cultures and Global Judicialization at the End of the 20th and the Be-
ginning of the 21st Century, 62 RHDI 617 (2009). 
5 Kress, supra note 1 at p 605. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/6
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the adversarial and inquisitorial systems.  To fully understand 
these power shifts and the role specific procedural devices play, 
it becomes necessary to think of the procedural spectrum be-
tween the two pure models as encompassing two different stra-
ta: the first relates to the actual power distribution between 
the main actors in the system while the second highlights the 
procedural devices employed to animate those powers. 
This article takes as its starting point the model of an ab-
solute, or pure, adversarial criminal trial.  That there is no 
such thing as a pure adversarial model or pure inquisitorial 
model is widely agreed to by scholars,6 however, the adversari-
al system is a logical starting point when examining the devel-
opment of ICP as, beginning with Nuremberg and during the 
early years of the ICTY, international criminal procedure was 
predicated upon the adversarial system.7  It should be made 
clear at this juncture that this article will not be concerned 
with the question of why this blending has occurred - that 
question is reserved for an examination of the causal justifica-
tions in a subsequent work - instead, this discussion is con-
cerned with how such blending has occurred in practice looking 
at the Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPEs).      
In order to assess the procedural developments that have 
taken place in ICP, this article will sketch a spectrum of proce-
dure within the theoretical framework between the pure adver-
sarial and pure inquisitorial models.  Using the concept of the 
pure adversarial model as a baseline, this article will then ex-
amine the Statutes and RPEs of three of the international 
courts and tribunals – the International Criminal Tribunal for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due 
Process and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1181, 1210 (2005); Mirjan Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary 
Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J.  COMP. 
L. 839 (1997); Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Transla-
tions: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis 
in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004). 
7 John Jackson, Finding the Best Epistemic Fit for International Crimi-
nal Tribunals Beyond the Adversarial–Inquisitorial Dichotomy, 7 J INT 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 17–39 (2009); Goran Sluiter, Law of International Criminal 
Procedure and Domestic War Crimes Trials, The, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 605 
(2006); Megret, supra note 3; Ambos, supra note 1; Langer, supra note 3.  A 
secondary justification for this starting point is the author’s primary training 
in the adversarial model of procedure. 
3
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the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC) – to explore where on the procedural spec-
trum each court falls.  
Looking at the degrees of shift discernable at these courts 
and tribunals allows us to see which elements of both the ad-
versarial and inquisitorial power structures have been extract-
ed, and which procedural devices employed, to form the new 
model(s) of ICP seen across the three courts.8  It is more appro-
priate to think of three separate models of ICP, rather than a 
single model applicable across all the international courts and 
tribunals, as each of the three courts displays unique charac-
teristics with no precise uniformity in each court’s rules.  What 
is evident from these models are convergences around struc-
tural ideas relating to the power relationships between the 
three main actors in the system, and the adoption of devices in 
furtherance of the overall goal of each court of having the judge 
as an active participant in proceedings. 
The extent to which a convergence around power struc-
tures is apparent can teach us about the scope of the spectrum 
of procedure found in the international courts and tribunals, 
and where the three courts fall between the adversarial and 
inquisitorial models.  Two primary observations can be drawn 
from this analysis. First, ICP in general has embraced neither 
a solely adversarial nor solely inquisitorial approach to han-
dling international criminal law cases.  Second, it is not possi-
ble to identify a single unified system of ICP as the interna-
tional courts and tribunals have not adopted identical 
procedures.  Indeed, while several similarities and broad con-
vergences around power restructuring is apparent across the 
courts, the exact mechanisms by which each court has achieved 
this power rebalance has differed.  The significance of this lies 
in the fact of convergence around power distribution between 
the parties. Through understanding that the international 
courts and tribunals have chosen to imbue the judges with a 
more active role in proceedings than found under a pure adver-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ambos, supra note 1; Megret, supra note 3 at 6; M. Findlay, Synthesis 
in Trial Procedures? The Experience of International Criminal Tribunals, 50 
INT’L  COMP. L. Q. 1 (2001); CHRISTOPHER J.M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2001). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/6
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sarial system, it becomes apparent that ICP has found more 
utility in inquisitorial role assignments.  
To frame the analysis of the development of ICP, the first 
part of this article will identify the procedural spectrum and 
the pure procedural models situated at either end.  Part I (a) 
will discuss the structural and procedural composites of the 
pure adversarial model. Part I (b) will outline the structural 
and procedural composites of the pure inquisitorial model, and 
highlight key distinctions from the adversarial model, in par-
ticular relating to the power allocation between the parties, 
and any procedural tools necessary for those parties to fulfill 
their roles.  Part I (c) will outline the spectrum of procedure be-
tween the two pure models and suggest that the optimum way 
to trace where upon this scale each court falls is to look at pow-
er distributions between the parties and specific procedural de-
vices employed to awaken those powers. 
Using the pure adversarial model expounded in part I (a) 
as the baseline for analysis, Parts II, III and IV of this article 
will explore the procedural evolution that has taken place at 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(II), the International Criminal Court (III) and the Extraordi-
nary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (IV).  Part V will 
then plot the structural and procedural shifts that have taken 
place at those courts onto the spectrum of procedure identified 
in part I (c), before concluding, in Part VI, with what these 
shifts teach us about the convergence of adversarial and inquis-
itorial mechanisms and the development of international crim-
inal procedure. 
I. THE PROCEDURAL SPECTRUM: THE ADVERSARIAL AND 
INQUISITORIAL MODELS AND EVERYTHING IN BETWEEN 
In order to understand the degrees of power shifts that 
have taken place at the ICTY, ICC and ECCC, it is necessary to 
clearly conceptualize what is meant by the two terms ‘adver-
sarial’ and ‘inquisitorial’ in their purest sense. These two legal 
traditions comprise opposite ends of the procedural spectrum, 
and the pure adversarial system in particular forms the base-
line for this paper’s subsequent analysis of how power distribu-
tion between the main actors in the international criminal sys-
5
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tem has played out.9  Describing these models as ‘pure’ has du-
al meaning: first, they are “pure in the sense that their defin-
ing features do not overlap between them, but rather each has 
an opposing feature to the other”10;  second, in the descriptive 
context in which the models are used in this article ‘pure’ also 
means ideal,11 i.e. if such a pure system existed it would have 
identical characteristics to an ideal model.  Because these pure 
models of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems are merely 
ideals, it is widely considered that “the models of adversarial 
and inquisitorial systems of justice are precisely that – models 
to which no actual legal system precisely corresponds.”12  It 
must be understood that a historical overview of how these two 
models have developed is outside the scope of this article, as is 
a thorough exploration of the different iterations of each model 
found in domestic systems. Instead, this paper seeks to de-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Here the word “tradition” is used in the comparitivist sense, meaning 
that instead of invoking imagery of a “frozen and static past,” it actually “de-
notes a vital, dynamic, ongoing system.” MARY ANN GLENDON & CHRISTOPHER 
OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS, AND CASES ON 
WESTERN LAW 23 (2007); John Henry Merryman suggests that this idea of a 
tradition refer to "a set of deeply rooted, historically conditions attitudes 
about the nature of law, about the role of law in society and the polity, about 
the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and about the way 
law is or should be made, applied, studied perfected and taught," JOHN 
HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL 
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (1985).  
10 Langer, supra note 3, at 884. 
11 GLENDON & OSAKWE, supra note 9 at 10.  
12 Kessler, supra note 6, at 1187; Langer, supra note 3; Sharon Finegan, 
Pro Se Criminal Trials and the Merging of Inquisitorial and Adversarial Sys-
tems of Justice, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 445 (2008); Louise Ellison, Protection of 
Vulnerable Witnesses in Court: An Anglo-Dutch Comparison, The, 3 INT’L J. 
EVIDENCE & PROOF 29 (1999); Andrew Hall, Where Do the Advocates Stand 
When the Goal Posts Are Moved, 14 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 107 (2010); 
Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, American Criminal Procedure in a European Context, 21 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409 (2012); Richard E. Myers, Adversarial Coun-
sel in an Inquisitorial System, 37 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 411 (2011); Mi-
chael Pawlik, Criminal Judge as Modern Inquisitor, 10 GERMAN L.J. 1274 
(2009); Allard Ringnalda, Inquisitorial or Adversarial - The Role of the Scot-
tish Prosecutor and Special Defences, 6 UTRECHT L. REV. 119 (2010); Giulio 
Illuminati, Frustrated Turn to Adversarial Procedure in Italy (Italian Crimi-
nal Procedure Code of 1988), The, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 567 
(2005); Nico Steytler, Making South African Criminal Procedure More Inquis-
itorial, 5 L. DEMOCRACY & DEV. 1 (2001); Gavin MacKenzie, Breaking the Di-
chotomy Habit: The Adversary System and the Ethics of Professionalism, 9 
CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 33 (1996). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/6
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scribe the central features of each system in its broadest sense.  
Developing a basic understanding of the pure forms of each 
system is crucial for the subsequent analysis of ICP, as it is on-
ly through this basic understanding that the points of conver-
gence in ICP are illuminated.   
a. The Pure Adversarial Model 
At one end of the procedural spectrum is the pure adver-
sarial model.  This system is primarily characterized by a dis-
pute between two parties, the prosecution and defense, and pits 
the two sides against each other in competition.13  Each disput-
ing party is imbued with formal procedural powers in order for 
them to discharge their respective duties of presenting the 
strongest possible case, with the goal of achieving a “just set-
tlement of the dispute.”14  The goal of the pure adversarial sys-
tem is not to actively seek the truth, but rather to determine 
whether the prosecution’s evidence proves that the accused 
committed the crimes with which he is charged.15  Under the 
adversarial model, the initial investigation is conducted by the 
police without supervision,16 and is followed by the parties - 
prosecution and defense - actively investigating and gathering 
evidence to support their respective cases.17  Neither the police 
nor the prosecution is obligated to investigate exculpatory evi-
dence for the defense;18 instead that burden rests with the de-
fense counsel.19   The prosecution and defense compete with 
each other, both forcefully and comprehensively investigating 
their cases, interviewing witnesses, and collecting evidence, in 
order to prove the guilt or innocence of the accused.20  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial 
Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1973). 
14 Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models 
of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 581 
(1972). 
15 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 373 (1st ed. 2003). 
16 SAFFERLING, supra note 8, at 55. 
17 CASSESE, supra note 15, at 367. 
18 Id. at 75. 
19 Renee Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial 
for an American Murder in the French Cour D’Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
791, 818 (2001). 
20 Mirjan Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: An-
7
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judge knows nothing of the facts of the case prior to trial, and 
only becomes acquainted with the facts through presentations 
of evidence by the parties.21  Each side has sole discretion over 
the presentation of evidence to prove their case,22 and vies with 
the other by presenting the evidence most favorable to it.23  
Each side tries to negate the other party’s arguments by calling 
its own witnesses and presenting its own evidence to refute 
that put forward by the other side.24     
There are a number of procedural devices available to the 
parties in the adversarial.  First, the prosecutor has broad 
prosecutorial discretion and holds the power to determine what 
charges should be entered against an accused.25  The corollary 
of this discretion is that the prosecutor is also able to deter-
mine when a dispute is over,26 which can occur in a number of 
ways; either by concluding that there isn’t enough evidence to 
proceed with a case,27 through plea-bargaining with the de-
fense,28 or by deciding how much evidence to enter in order to 
prove the crimes charged.29  Plea-bargaining in particular is an 
important weapon in the adversarial arsenal, as it allows the 
parties to negotiate their position outside of the courtroom, 
without the input of a judge, and to try to reach a resolution 
without going through a full trial in court.30  The judge is bound 
to accept the plea agreement reached by both sides and no 
more proof concerning the guilt of the accused is required.31 
When the case does come to court it is presided over by a 
“passive umpire,”32 an independent judge whose primary func-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
glo-American and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 847 (1997). 
21 CASSESE, supra note 15, at 373. 
22 Id. at 369. 
23 Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models 
of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 525 
(1972). 
24 Damaska, Uncertain Fate, supra note 20, at 847. 
25 CASSESE, supra note 15 at 367. 
26 Langer, supra note 3 at 843. 
27 Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 THE AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 643–664, 645 (2002). 
28 CASSESE, supra note 15, at 370. 
29 SAFFERLING, supra note 8, at 221. 
30 Id. at 272. 
31 Id. at 272. 
32 Langer, supra note 6, at 840; Gerald Walpin, America’s Adversarial 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/6
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tion to is to ensure that there is fair play between the prosecu-
tion and defense in their competition, and that standards of 
due process are met.33 In discharging her obligation of uphold-
ing fairness in proceedings the judge must decide on disputes 
presented to her by the prosecution and defense.  In this way, 
the judge is reactive to what is presented to her, rather than 
being proactive in molding the direction of trial, which is more 
commonly found in a pure inquisitorial system.34  The pure ad-
versarial system adopts a bifurcated court structure, which 
combines both a lay organ as a decider of fact (a jury of peers) 
and a professional organ as the trier of law (the judge).35  Due 
to the emphasis on laypersons as the trier of fact, the adversar-
ial system has historically preferred oral evidence at trial so as 
to avoid burdening the lay jury with reams of written state-
ments to wade through.36 
In the pure adversarial court, the judge ensures the appli-
cation of the rules of evidence, which are particularly de-
tailed.37 These rules of evidence act as a filter to determine 
what the trier of fact (the jury) is permitted to see.38  In follow-
ing these comprehensive, formal, rules the judge settles dis-
putes between the parties relating to admissibility and credibil-
ity of witnesses and evidence,39 with the goal of ensuring that 
prejudicial evidence in not presented to the trier of fact.40  
In this pure system, the roles played by each party are 
very distinct.  The prosecutor and defense are equal competi-
tors in the dispute,41 and in this contest both prosecution and 
defense are zealous advocates of their case.  The prosecution 
has the burden to prove that the accused committed the crimes 
with which he is charged, and must persuade the judge that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and Jury Systems: More Likely to Do Justice, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 
176 (2003); Damaska, supra note 6, at 850.   
33 Alphons Orie, Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in International 
Criminal Proceedings, II in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, 1427 (2002). 
34 Walpin, supra note 32, at 176. 
35 CASSESE, supra note 15, at 368. 
36 Id. at 369. 
37 Id. at 374. 
38 Orie, supra note 33, at 1428. 
39 Id. at 1451. 
40 CASSESE, supra note 15, at 375. 
41 Goldstein, supra note 13, at 1014. 
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that burden has been extinguished through the prosecutor’s 
presentation of the facts.42  Each has a duty to independently 
raise all pertinent evidence,43 and to rigorously cross-examine 
evidence presented by the other side.44  Consequently, what 
emerges is a critical examination of the law applied to the 
facts, and the trier of fact must determine which side has been 
the most effective adversary and most persuasively presented 
its case and rule in its favor.    
b. The Pure Inquisitorial Model 
At the other end of the procedural spectrum lies the pure 
inquisitorial system, which is significantly structurally and 
procedurally different from the adversarial model.  While both 
systems are invested in determining the truth,45 the adversari-
al system is more interested in a “just outcome,”46 whereas the 
inquisitorial system pursues the objective truth.47  It attempts 
to get at this objective truth through an official investigation 
conducted by impartial public officials.48 
Rather than being an individual party to the case, the 
prosecutor is considered an impartial official, along with the 
judge, and both are tasked with the goal of discovering the 
truth.49  In a pure, traditional, inquisitorial system, the prose-
cutor initiates an inquiry and passes this to the investigating 
judge, who then pursues all lines of inquiry he considers use-
ful.50  In other, less traditional, inquisitorial systems, the pros-
ecutor retains the investigatory power, and is subject to judicial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Id. at 1016. 
43 SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 222, 
224 (2001). 
44 Id. at 283–84. 
45 Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers supra note 23, at 513. 
46 Id. at 581. 
47 William Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal 
Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil 
Law Foundation, 17 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 7. 
48 Damaska, supra note 23, at 26; Gordon Van Kessel, European Perspec-
tives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence, 100 WEST 799, 800–
801 (1998). 
49 Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers supra note 23, at 580–583. 
50 Lerner, supra note 19, at 802; Goldstein, supra note 13, at 1018. 
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monitoring of that investigation.51 
This investigating official has primary responsibility for 
directing and supervising the gathering of evidence in the case, 
questioning witnesses and suspects and exploring all pertinent 
lines of inquiry; she ultimately determines whether there is 
sufficient evidence to take a case to trial.52  If the investigating 
official is a prosecutor, that decision may be subjected to review 
by judges.53  However, unlike prosecutorial discretion in the 
adversarial system, in the inquisitorial system there is a ‘legal-
ity principle’ that presumes a prosecution should take place 
wherever sufficient evidence exists to prove the guilt of the ac-
cused.54  Because of this principle, the concept of a guilty plea is 
foreign to an inquisitorial system,55 and the judge can find that 
a defendant’s confession alone is not enough to substantiate the 
truth and can instead proceed with a full trial.56 
The method of official investigation requires that the pros-
ecutor gather both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence and 
share it with the defense, rather than be the antagonist as in 
the adversarial system.57   Instead of being viewed as a proce-
dural equal as in the adversarial system, under inquisitorial 
procedures the defense is seen as the target of the investiga-
tion.  Because of this perception of the defense it does not col-
lect its own evidence as the “state organs bear responsibility 
during the process for the well-being of the accused.”58  The de-
fense is able to suggest the collection of certain evidence and 
request the investigating official interview specific witnesses.59  
Unlike the bifurcated court of the adversarial system, in 
the inquisitorial system there is a unitary court, one where the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Pizzi and Marafioti, supra note 47; Goldstein, supra note 13, at 1019; 
Damaska, supra note 6 at 843. 
52 Damaska, supra note 23, at 559. 
53 Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for 
Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW 261, 366 (1976); Pizzi 
and Marafioti, supra note 47. 
54 CASSESE, supra note 15, at 367. 
55 Id. at 370. 
56 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 370 (2003 ed.). 
57 Lerner, supra note 19, at 802. 
58 Safferling, supra note 8, at 75. 
59 Lerner, supra note 19, at 802–803. 
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judge is the decider of fact and of law.60  The concept of a lay-
jury is alien,61 and instead the system is hierarchical, with a 
professionalized judiciary comprised of legal professional deci-
sion makers.62 
One of the central procedural devices employed in the in-
quisitorial system is the dossier.63  The compilation of the dos-
sier is an indispensable part of the pre-trial process, as it rec-
ords all the information gathered all procedural activity and 
forms the basis of the trial itself; it is a fundamental part of the 
“instruction maxim” of the inquisitorial system.64  The dossier 
affords the judge advance knowledge of the facts and evidence 
of case,65 which allows her to effectively conduct the trial pro-
ceedings and exercise the powers allocated to her as an investi-
gating official in the inquisitorial system.66 
Equipped with the dossier, the inquisitorial judge controls 
proceedings and determines what evidence to produce and wit-
nesses to call and in which order; generally the order is dictat-
ed by what the judge deems to be most helpful to the progres-
sion of the case.67  The judge takes the lead in questioning68 
and, whilst there is no formal cross-examination, any witness 
summoned by request of the judge is open to follow up ques-
tioning by both prosecution and defense.69  The accused is gen-
erally given the opportunity to speak first, and then questioned 
by the judges on his narrative testimony.70 In an inquisitorial 
process there is no dispute to address, instead, only one case is 
presented by the impartial investigator in order to determine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Pizzi and Marafioti, supra note 47, at 7. 
61 GERHARD O. W. MUELLER & FRE LE POOLE-GRIFFITHS, COMPARATIVE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 5 (1969).  
62 MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 42 (1986).  
63 Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 23 at 533. 
64 MUELLER AND POOLE-GRIFFITHS, supra note 61 at 7. 
65 Orie, supra note 33, at 1451. 
66 Pizzi and Marafioti, supra note 47, at 7; DAMASKA, The Uncertain Fate supra 
note 20, at 850. 
67 Pizzi and Marafioti, supra note 47, at 7. 
68 Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 23 at 525. 
69 CASSESE, supra note 15 at 373. 
70 Goldstein, supra note 13 at 1018; Damaska, supra note 23, at 527; Lerner, su-
pra note 19, at 828. 
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the truth, and if the defense wishes to have certain evidence 
produced he must request it of the judge.71   
In contrast to the adversarial system, there are few formal 
rules of evidence.72  This sits in line with the truth determining 
function of the pure inquisitorial system as “fixed evidentiary 
rules might lead to the exclusion of important probative evi-
dence.”73  The preference for a professional judge rather than a 
lay-jury alleviates the need for extensive evidentiary rules as it 
is assumed that a professional judge is able to weigh all evi-
dence according to merit in making her determination of the 
guilt or innocence of the accused. 
c. A Spectrum of Procedure between the Pure Models 
An outline of the two pure models highlights the stark dif-
ferences between them across all phases of procedure.  Several 
ways to distinguish between the two models are suggested in 
the literature, for example Kessler has suggested that the dis-
tinction rests on three elements of litigation “initiating the ac-
tion, gathering the evidence, and determining the sequence and 
the nature of proceedings,”74 while Langer suggests that they 
are distinguishable on four separate levels, offering “two differ-
ent techniques to handle criminal cases [and] two different pro-
cedural cultures”, with both having distinct “different legal 
identities [and offering] two different ways to distribute powers 
and responsibilities between the main actors in criminal proce-
dure.”75  In thinking about how ICP has developed, all of these 
distinctions become extremely important when looking at 
where, and to what extent, ICP has converged on a general 
body of procedural law. 
Once we understand the pure models and their distinctions we can 
begin to think about them as embracing either end of a spectrum of pro-
cedure.  Figure 1 (below) contrasts the two models directly with each 
other across several different planes, from which we can see that each 
system has an opposing feature to the other. We can think about the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 CASSESE, supra note 15 at 373. 
72 Orie, supra note 33 at 1452; Pizzi and Marafioti, supra note 47 at 7. 
73 Pizzi and Marafioti, supra note 47, at 7. 
74 Kessler, supra note 6 at 1187. 
75 Langer, Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 
supra note 3 at 852. 
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space between each of the opposing features as embracing a spectrum, 
within which it is possible to envisage many variations between the two.  
Fig. 1: The Two Pure Forms of Procedure 
 




Nature of the 
proceedings 
A dispute between 
two active parties 
conducting cases in 
competition with one 
another (prosecution 
and defense). 
A unified Official In-
vestigation conducted 
by impartial officials 
(prosecutor and judge) 
to determine the truth. 
Role of the 
judge 
To act as an impar-
tial “passive umpire” 
to the dispute put to 
them by the two ad-
versaries (prosecu-
tion and defense).  
To investigate the 
truth, and to actively 
pursue independent 
lines of investigation 
and evidence. 
 
Nature of the 
court 
Bifurcated court 
that relies on ‘lay’ 
decision makers of 
fact to determine 
guilt.  Judge deter-
mines sentencing. 
Unitary court which 
relies upon profession-
al decision makers 
(judges) to determine 
both guilt and sentenc-
ing. 
Role of the 
prosecutor 
To actively investi-
gate and prosecute 
his case. 
A public official tasked 
with investigating 
both inculpatory and 
exculpatory evidence 
to determine the truth. 
Role of the 
defense 
To actively investi-
gate and defend the 
accused. 
Prosecutor and de-
fense have formal 
powers. 





Both prosecution and 
defense have equal 
procedural powers. 
Exculpatory evidence 
is passed from the offi-
cial investigator to the 
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investigation defense.  Defense can 
request the official in-
vestigator to gather 
evidence on its behalf. 
Discretion in 
charging 
The prosecutor has 
broad prosecutorial 
discretion and is able 
to decide when a 
dispute concludes. 
The discretion to dis-
miss a case lies with 
the judge.  The prose-
cutor’s role is to de-
termine the truth and 
can only decline to 






mit the parties to 
negotiate between 
themselves to end a 
case without the in-
volvement of the 
judge, including 
guilty pleas, stipula-
tions and plea bar-
gaining.  
Judge has the fi-
nal word on the inves-
tigation and thus can 
find that the defend-
ant’s confession alone 
does not constitute 
proof of guilt beyond a 




tailed rules of evi-
dence to evaluate ev-
idence admissibility 
in order to monitor 
what the lay decision 
makers are exposed 
to. 
Rejects detailed evi-
dentiary rules and 
generally admits all 
relevant evidence, 
based on the assump-
tion that a profession-
al judiciary can weigh 
prejudicial evidence 
and exclude from deci-
sion making where 
necessary. 
 




ferred oral evidence, 
to avoid requiring 
lay jurors to read 
reams of written 
statements. 
A written dossier doc-
uments all procedural 
activity and evidence 
gathered.   
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If we assume that the pure adversarial system splits power 
equally between the prosecution and defense, with the judge as 
an independent passive umpire, and that the pure inquisitorial 
system combines the judge and prosecutor into a unified official 
investigator, with the defense as the target of prosecution, then 
it is possible to imagine a sliding scale between those two ex-
tremes of power distribution.  
It is the contention here that the ICP across the ICTY, ICC 
and ECCC has each adopted a position upon this spectrum be-
tween the two extremes, converging upon a movement towards 
inquisitorial mechanisms as the norm in ICP.  This paper as-
serts that, underlying the distinctions suggested by Kessler76 
and Langer,77 the definitive characteristic of this convergence 
rests on the power distribution between the main actors in the 
system.  Taking the traditional pure adversarial system as our 
baseline, the primary structural shift we see across all the in-
ternational courts is the removal of power out the hands of the 
parties (prosecution and defense) and into the hands of the 
judge.  This redistribution is embodied by increased procedural 
powers that permit the judge to become a more active partici-
pant in proceedings, representing a shift away from the judge 
as a “passive umpire.”78  These increased procedural powers 
necessarily place additional burdens on the prosecution and de-
fense, again more akin to those found in an inquisitorial sys-
tem.  This shift in power dynamics, and moving powers away 
from the prosecution and defense and into the hands of the 
judge, is evident to differing extents across each stage of pro-
ceedings at the international courts: from investigatory powers 
to indictment, and permeating all pre- and during trial pro-
ceedings.  All of these power shifts are underlined by procedur-
al devices that incorporate mechanisms from both the adver-
sarial and procedural cultures in order to effectuate the re-
allocation of power.  This article asserts that the roles ascribed 
the parties in ICP represent a paradigm shift away from adver-
sarial process upon which international criminal procedure was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 See Kessler, supra note 6. . 
77 See Langer, Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal 
Law, supra note 3.  
78 Id. at 840. 
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initially founded towards a more inquisitorial model.   
The hypothesis of shifting power dynamics will be tested 
through employing the pure model of the adversarial system as 
a baseline.  This model will be used to look at the statutes and 
the RPEs of the three courts to show how far the procedural 
systems in those courts and tribunals have moved across the 
spectrum away from a pure adversarial tradition and towards 
inquisitorial procedure.  The subsequent analysis will look at 
power shifts between the parties and will identify power distri-
butions and the particular procedural devices upon which the 
different courts have converged in their usage.  Mapping these 
power shifts and structural changes across the procedural spec-
trum and identifying where there are similarities and differ-
ences illuminates which elements of the two diverse models of 
procedure have come to be relied upon in the international sys-
tem.  It is interesting that, while each court has come to a posi-
tion more closely aligned with inquisitorial mechanisms, the 
precise mechanisms that each court has chosen to employ to 
get there has differed.   
The following three sections will examine the ICTY, ICC 
and ECCC.  In each section a brief procedural history of each 
court will first be introduced, followed by a discussion of the 
procedural devices incorporated into that court’s Statute and 
RPE’s, and an identification of the pure model from which 
those devices are drawn.  A full comparative analysis of the 
power structures and devices employed by the three courts is 
reserved for Part V, whereupon this article will plot the devel-
opments of each system onto the procedural scale and identify 
any convergences across the three courts. 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA 
a. Procedural History of the ICTY 
During the initial drafting of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia79 and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Statute of the International 
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RPEs80 reference was made to both the adversarial and inquisi-
torial models81 and, although the “draft statute [of the ICTY] – 
which the Security Council approved without changes – did not 
have a clear adversarial slant,”82 the adopted RPE’s had “a 
clear adversarial inclination.” 83   This proclivity can be at-
tributed to the heavy influence of the United States during the 
drafting process, and the fact that the “majority of judges fa-
vored a predominantly adversarial system …’[b]ased on the 
limited precedent of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, and in 
order for … judges, to remain as impartial as possible.’”84  Con-
sequently, the responsibilities and powers assigned to the pros-
ecutor and the defense followed adversarial lines, with the 
judges espousing the role of passive umpires,85 and all actors in 
the system adopted, at least to some extent, the adversarial 
model in their dealings with the court: 
 
There were two reasons for this: First, because the judges were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Adopted on 25 May 1993, Se-
curity Council Resolution 827. 
80 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence, Adopted on 11 February 1994, U.N. Doc: IT/32 
81 Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary System, 40 LOY. 
L. A. L. REV. 653 (2006); Langer, supra note 3; Michael Asimow, Popular Cul-
ture and the American Adversarial Ideology, in LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 
712 (Michael Freeman ed., 2004) available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=481282 (last visited Jul 16, 2012).   
82 Langer, Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 
supra note 3 at 856. 
83 Id. at 857; Hervé Ascensio, The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
ICTY, 9 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 467-78, 467 (1996); Fairlie supra note,1,  at 243, 
245. 
84 Langer, Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 
supra note 3 at 858, quoting President of the Tribunal Antonio Cassese, 
Statement by the President made at a Briefing to Members of Diplomatic 
Missions, Summary of the Rules of Procedure at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, (1994). 
85 Langer, Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law 
supra note 3 at 858.  There was broad prosecutorial discretion regarding 
whether to investigate and bring charges.  Structurally, the case was orga-
nized as a dispute between prosecution and defense, with each side in contest 
with each other.  The evidence belonged either to one party or the other, and 
the traditional adversarial methods of direct, cross, re-direct and rejoinder 
were utilized. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/6
6. JESSICA PEAKE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/14  8:08 PM 
200 PACE INT’L L. REV. PUBLIC EDITION [Vol.  XXVI::2 
convinced that the Rules had enacted a predominantly adversar-
ial procedure, they generally tried to behave according to that 
system – even those from civil law jurisdictions.  Thus, legal ac-
tors who came from inquisitorial backgrounds generally accepted 
that many of their internal dispositions did not apply in this in-
ternational context.  Second, since there is a certain interdepend-
ence between a number of features of each of these systems, the 
predominance of the adversarial system initially prevented, or at 
least weakened, the development of inquisitorial practices within 
it.86   
 
Although not a pure adversarial system, the emphasis was 
on a competition between adversaries, with both prosecution 
and defense as procedural equals.  The prosecutor was not re-
quired to search for both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, 
87 and the defense had “similar procedural powers to the prose-
cution for developing its own case, calling its own witnesses, in-
terrogating its witnesses and the witnesses of the prosecu-
tion.”88  
Unfortunately, the ICTY was plagued by excruciatingly slow pro-
cessing times,89 which was attributed to the adversarial structure adopted 
under the Tribunal’s early RPEs.90  The failings of the adversarial struc-
ture for trials of this magnitude presented itself in two ways:  “The first 
problem was in the structure of the adversarial process itself, organized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Id. at 859–860.  Langer analyzes the choices made by the drafters as 
embodying two distinct patterns: “Choosing between the dispute and official 
investigation models, the judges chose the dispute one.  Choosing how to or-
ganize authority, the judges struck a much more even balance between the 
hierarchical and coordinate models.  But the latter choice to blend the hierar-
chical and coordinate models reflect not the relative power of actors with ad-
versarial or inquisitorial dispositions, but the shared convictions of judges 
and policy-makers, including even those from common law jurisdictions.” (Id. 
at 868) 
87 Id. at 861. 
88 Id. at 861. One nod to the inquisitorial was the dispensation of tech-
nical rules of evidence common to the adversarial system, but preference still 
remained for the adversarial method of evidence delivery by oral testimony. 
(Id. at 867-868) 
89 D. Wippman, The Costs of International Justice., 100 AM. J.  INT’L L. 
861 (2006); Constantinos Hotis, Fair and Expeditious Trial: A Reappraisal of 
Slobodan Milosevic’s Right to Self-Representation before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, A, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 775 (2005). 
90 Langer, supra note 3 at  XX. 
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according to the dispute model.”91  This model placed the burden of 
proof on the prosecution and in order to discharge the burden, it was nec-
essary for the prosecutor to “gauge in advance how much evidence will 
be enough to persuade the decision-maker.”92  This often led to the pros-
ecution presenting much more evidence than was necessary, resulting in 
delays and lengthy proceedings.93  The second, related problem was the 
presence of often hundreds of witnesses in proceedings, directly attribut-
able to the ICTY’s preference for oral testimony common to the adver-
sarial system, which again resulted in delays and lengthy proceedings. 94   
Given that the ICTY was the first international court since Nurem-
berg, created to hold individuals criminally responsible,95 it was under-
standable that the ICTY would have adopted its predecessor’s procedure 
during its early years.  However, as it became clear that the Tribunal was 
ill equipped to discharge its duties employing the adversarial tools origi-
nally provided to it,96 those criticisms became the impetus for procedural 
change and led to the incorporation of more inquisitorial mechanisms in-
to the procedural structure. These reforms were characterized by a “re-
definition and re-signification” of those procedural features found in the 
adversarial and inquisitorial systems.97  
b. Structural Shifts and Power Distribution at the ICTY 
With the introduction of the inquisitorial mechanisms, 
such as increased pre-trial management and the judge being 
able to limit the amount of witnesses called by the parties, 
came a structural shift, redefining the roles of the parties and 
the power allocation between them. Alongside the structural 
reforms between parties, there was a visible shift towards us-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Langer, supra note 3, at 872. 
92 Id. at 872. 
93 This is a common problem in jury trials, where the prosecutor, unable 
to converse with the Jury, labors a point of which they are convinced, spend-
ing time that could be better spent elsewhere on persuading them of an ar-
gument they are less sure of. Groome, supra note 4 at 801. 
94 Langer, supra note 3, at 873. 
95 The issue of what procedural laws and principles to apply in the con-
text of an international criminal trial first arose at Nuremberg  Richard May 
& Mareike Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, 
Tokyo, The Hague and Arusha, 37 COLUMBIA JOUR 725 (1999); Langer, supra 
note3at 8; Groome, supra note 4 at 792. 
96 Robinson, supra note 2, at 573–588. 
97 Langer, supra note 3, at 879–880. 
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ing procedural devices familiar to the inquisitorial system.  
From its creation, the ICTY shared with the inquisitorial sys-
tem a “preference for the professionalization of the legal pro-
cess,”98 and this did not alter with the introduction of more in-
quisitorial mechanisms.  Rather, as a result of the ICTY’s 
structural reforms,  the relationship between the prosecution 
and defense altered. Instead of the emphasis on competition 
between the parties as seen in the adversarial system and un-
der the early formulations of the RPE’s, more collaboration and 
cooperation was encouraged between the two.99  The new rules, 
such as Rule 65 ter, did not go so far as instituting an official 
investigation in the pure inquisitorial sense, but rather moved 
case management powers out of the hands of the individual 
parties and placed them in the hands of the judge who was now 
imbued with increased powers to manage and facilitate party 
cooperation.100  This was an abrupt shift in procedure at the 
ICTY, as it required the parties to play a dual role alien to the 
adversarial system; they must prosecute their own case with 
the utmost fervor while at the same time assisting the court.101  
These reforms also signaled a shift away from the passive, dis-
engaged judge under the adversarial model towards increased 
judicial involvement and management extremely familiar to an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98Langer, supra note 3, at 881. 
99  Langer, Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law,  
supra note 3 at 880 . 
100 Langer and Doherty, supra note 3 at 260–265.  The introduction of 
Rule 65 ter met the objective of having judicial management pre-trial in order 
to increase the efficiency of trial preparation, and consequently to expedite 
the process of the trials.  Unfortunately, as Langer and Doherty indicate in 
their empirical study, this objective was not met, and actually oftentimes had 
the opposite effect of lengthening procedure.  They tested the effect of the re-
forms on pretrial proceedings and found that “The effect was substantially 
and statistically significant.  During the period before reforms or after only a 
few reforms were in place (zero to three reforms) there was an eighty percent 
probability that the pretrial phase would have ended before the seventh hun-
dred day.  After all or nearly all the reforms were in place (eight to nine re-
forms) there was only a forty percent probability that the pretrial phase 
would have ended by the seventh day” (Id. at 260)  It must be noted that the-
se statistics encompass not only the reforms introduced by Rule 65ter, but al-
so those allowing, amongst other things, less use of live testimony (Rule 89 
amended and 92bis adopted), permitting the trial chamber to fix the number 
of crime sites and incidents, and various measures under Rule 65 bis relating 
to status conferences (Id. at 299). 
101 Langer, supra note 3 at 890. 
21
6. JESSICA PEAKE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/14  8:08 PM 
2014] SPECTRUM OF INT’L CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 203 
inquisitorial system.   
In accordance with the reformed procedure at the ICTY the 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) issues an indictment after they 
have conducted an investigation.102  The indictment is then re-
viewed by a judge who examines each count and supporting 
documentation and determines whether a prima facie case ex-
ists against a suspect, in accordance with Article 19(1) ICTY 
Statute.103  The Judge is able to request more information from 
the OTP to make that decision, and can ultimately accept or re-
ject the indictment.104   Once the indictment is confirmed, the 
pre-trial judge, designated within seven days of the initial ap-
pearance of the accused,105 is vested with the power to establish 
a work-plan for the parties in order to assist them in preparing 
for trial in a timely manner.106 Under these reforms, the pre-
trial judge is required to become intricately acquainted with 
the facts to enable them to extinguish these responsibilities ad-
equately.107  To assist the judge the parties are required to 
submit pre-trial briefs to the court before the opening of the 
trial, by order of Rule 65 ter(E).108   
Under the reformed rules open communication between 
the parties became paramount.109  The prosecution is required 
to disclose its case strategy,110 and must cooperate with the de-
fense on settling issues of fact.111  The prosecution is also re-
quired to provide a detailed list of witnesses, the factual basis 
on which the witnesses will testify, and whether that witness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 When conducting an investigation the prosecutor is not under an obli-
gation to investigate exculpatory evidence, however they do have a duty to 
“disclose to the defense any material which in the actual knowledge of the 
prosecutor may suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or 
affect the credibility of prosecution evidence” ICTY RULES OF PROCEDURE AND 
EVIDENCE, IT/32/REV.46 Rule 68 (2011). 
103 Id. Rule 47(E). 
104  Id. Rule 47(F). 
105 ICTY RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, IT/32/REV. 45 Rule 65 ter 
(A) (2010). 
106 ICTY RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, IT/32/REV.46  Rule 65 ter 
(D)(ii) (2011). 
107 Langer, supra note 3 at 891. 
108 ICTY RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, IT/32/REV.46  Rule 65 ter 
(E). 
109 Id. Rule 65 ter (B). 
110 Id. Rule 65 ter (E)(i). 
111 Langer, supra note 3 at 892. 
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will appear in person or by written statement.112  The prosecu-
tion must give a time estimate for each witness, and an esti-
mate of the total time for their case.113   Similarly, the defense 
is required to submit a pre-trial brief, indicating any defenses 
to be relied upon, and any issues the defense has with the pros-
ecution’s case as indicated in its pre-trial brief, and reasons for 
those issues.114  Like the prosecution, prior to the start of the 
defense case they must submit a list of witnesses and exhib-
its.115  Failure to meet their obligations under these rules can 
result in sanctions upon the violating party.116 
Following the submission of their pre-trial briefs, the pro-
cess is passed from the Pre-Trial Judge to the Trial Chamber, 
and the Trial Chamber is required to hold a pre-trial confer-
ence with the parties prior to the opening of the trial.117  It is 
during these conferences that the shift in power dynamic from 
the parties to the judges is most pronounced, as it is at this 
stage that the judge can alter the proposed activities of each 
party during the proceedings: the court can request that the 
parties shorten the estimated time of examination-in-chief for 
witnesses;118 require the parties to call fewer witnesses, and119 
select particular crime sites or incidents as representative of 
the crimes charged.120 As discussed, the impetus for many of 
these procedural reforms was to shorten the amount of time it 
took cases to be processed at the court,121 and in furtherance of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev.46 Rule 65 
ter(E)(ii)(e). 
113 Id. Rule 65 ter (E)(ii). 
114  Id.  Rule 65 ter (F). 
115   Id. Rule 65 ter (G). 
116 Id. Rule 65 ter (N). 
117 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 45 Rule 73 bis 
(2010). 
118 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev.46  Rule 73 bis (B) 
(2011). 
119  Id. Rule 73 bis (C).  The Trial Chamber judge can make these limita-
tions “in light of the file submitted to the Trial Judge pursuant to Rule 65 ter 
(L)(i)” and after having heard the prosecutor. 
120  Id. Rule 73 bis. 
121 Langer and Doherty, supra note 3. In assessing the managerial judg-
ing reforms at the ICTY, Langer and Doherty conclude that the promise of 
managerial judging (a mechanism used in U.S. domestic civil procedure, 
which refers to an apparatus that encourages judicial activism to promote 
expediency by requiring judges to play an active role in both pre-trial and 
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that goal the reformed RPEs permit the court to exercise con-
trol over the mode and presentation of witnesses and evidence, 
to ensure no time is wasted.122   Similarly, the Court also has 
discretion to hold a pre-defense conference prior to the start of 
the defense case,123 during which the Trial Judge has the same 
powers of limitation as with the prosecution case, and can re-
quire the limiting of witnesses,124 reducing the time for exami-
nation-in-chief of witnesses called125 and determine the time for 
presenting evidence.126  These reforms all embrace procedural 
techniques that are not available under a pure adversarial sys-
tem, and have the effect of shifting power away from both the 
prosecution and defense in favor of the judges.  The conse-
quence of these reforms is to significantly empower the judge to 
exercise much more control over the progression of the prosecu-
tion and defense cases than was permitted under the earlier 
adversarial processes, by restricting witnesses, evidence and 
crime sites and thus giving the judges the power to shape how 
the parties present their cases.  These powers embody inquisi-
torial traits as under that pure system the judge, as an official 
investigator, is empowered with similar discretions.  
In order to effectuate the transfer of procedural powers 
from the parties to the bench, one of the most important proce-
dural devices adopted by the ICTY is the ‘file’ under Rule 
65ter(L)(i),127 the functions of which are familiar to the inquisi-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
trail proceedings) has been unfulfilled, and has in fact had the opposite effect 
of expediency, impeding upon the quick resolution of cases through the intro-
duction of many extra procedural stepsId. at 243. Langer and Doherty identi-
fied two main reasons for this failure through their quantitative analysis of 
the proceedings at the ICTY: firstly, that “judges either did not use their 
managerial powers or used them ineffectively” and; secondly, “because the 
prosecution and defense resisted the reforms.”Id. at 269. 
122 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 45 Rule 73 bis (F) 
(2010).  
123 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev.46  Rule 73 ter 
(2011). 
124  Id. Rule 73 ter (C). 
125  Id. Rule 73 ter (B). 
126 Id. Rule 73 ter (E). The defense is also permitted, if it considers it to 
be in the interests of justice, to file a motion to reinstate the list of witnesses 
or to vary the decision as to which witnesses are to be called, once the defense 
case has commenced 
127 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 45 Rule 65 ter (L)(i) 
(2010) 
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torial dossier.  Compiled after the prosecution has filed its pre-
trial brief, the ‘file’ consists of that brief and the prosecution’s 
witness and exhibits list, all the filings of the parties to date, 
transcripts of status conferences and any minutes of other 
meetings held.128  A second ‘file’ incorporating the pre-trial brief 
and list of witnesses submitted by the defense supplements the 
first ‘file’.129  As a whole, these files provide the trial court with 
considerable information about the case and allow the judges to 
actively manage the case during the proceedings.  A pre-trial 
dossier is germane to the inquisitorial system, however Langer 
distinguishes the ICTY managerial file from that, as the in-
quisitorial dossier documents and impartially records all previ-
ous activity between the parties prior to trial.130  Conversely, at 
the ICTY, the file mainly consists of the pre-trial briefs of the 
parties and is provided to give the judges the knowledge to be-
come “active expediting managers, rather than active investi-
gators.”131  This is a key distinction between the reformed sys-
tem under the revised RPEs at the ICTY and a pure 
inquisitorial system.  Unlike in an inquisitorial system where 
the official investigator conducts impartial investigations to 
achieve the fulfillment of the truth determining function of that 
system. The file compiled by the pre-trial judge acts as a road-
map for the court, to assist the trial judges in their goal of be-
coming knowledgeable and informed managers of the trial pro-
ceedings. 
Article 15 of the Statute of the ICTY left the adoption of 
the rules of evidence to the judges.  The judges subsequently 
chose to incorporate broad evidentiary standards, which permit 
the admission of any relevant evidence of probative value, un-
less it is significantly outweighed by the need to ensure a fair 
trial.132  This mirrors the inquisitorial preference for non-
detailed rules of evidence, in reliance of the professionalism of 
the judiciary to weigh evidence accordingly.  Another procedur-
al development at the Tribunal has been an adoption of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Id.  Rule 65ter(L)(i). 
129 Id.  Rule 65 ter (L)(ii). 
130 See Langer, supra note 3 at 887. 
131 Langer, Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 
supra note 3 at 898. 
132 ICTY RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, IT/32/REV. 45 Rule 89 (C)–
(D) (2010). 
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preference for written evidence, in certain specified instanc-
es.133 Interestingly, although this is a procedural device is heav-
ily employed in the inquisitorial system, Langer has been keen 
to emphasize,  
Judges have not introduced these reforms out of a bureaucratic 
preference for documentation as in the hierarchical model of the 
inquisitorial system.  Rather, as ICTY judges have expressly 
acknowledged, they have perceived the increasing introduction of 
written evidence at trial as a way to speed it up, even at the ex-
pense of fairness and truth determination.134  
 
Lamentably, the inquisitorial method of collecting written 
evidence pre-trial by impartial officials has not been followed, 
and “in the context of the ICTY, as a consequence of the party-
driven investigations, written statements admitted at trial in-
clude statements not gathered in such an impartial fashion.”135  
This is emblematic of issues that can arise when blending in-
quisitorial and adversarial mechanisms, while not ensuring 
that due process and the fundamental protections of rights of 
individuals under each system are met.136 
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, although the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133  Id. Rule 92 bis; See also Langer, Rise of Managerial Judging in Inter-
national Criminal Law, supra note 3 at 901; See also Langer and Doherty, 
supra note 3 at 273-274. 
134 ICTY RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, IT/32/REV. 45 Rule 92 bis 
(2010); “judges have not introduced these reforms out of a bureaucratic pref-
erence for documentation as in the hierarchical model of the inquisitorial sys-
tem.  Rather, as ICTY judges have expressly acknowledged, they have per-
ceived the increasing introduction of written evidence at trial as a way to 
speed it up, even at the expense of fairness and truth determination.” Langer, 
Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, supra note 3 at 
901. Regrettably, Langer and Doherty found that despite these reforms “the 
number of live witnesses remained relatively steady [which] suggests that 
the introduction of Rule 92 bis did not reduce the number of live witnesses at 
trial.” Langer and Doherty, supra note 3 at 273. Moreover their findings sug-
gest “Rule 92 bis statements have been introduced mainly on top of, and not 
instead of, live witnesses.” Id. at 274. 
135 Langer, Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 
supra note 3 at 901. 
136 See e.g. John D. Jackson, Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Eviden-
tiary Processes: Towards Convergence, Divergence or Realignment, The, 68 
MOD. L. REV. 737, 758 (2005); Megret, supra note 3; See generally Gregory S 
Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process Aspira-
tions and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635 (2006). 
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ICTY has not embraced all aspects of inquisitorial procedure, 
the structural reforms that have taken place at the ICTY have 
had the effect of moving the procedural system away from its 
adversarial roots to a system more closely aligned with the in-
quisitorial model.  Under the reformed system, the power to 
structure proceedings has increasingly shifted away from the 
hands of the parties and into the hands of the judge.  To effec-
tuate this, the ICTY has adopted several devices familiar to the 
inquisitorial system, including extensive use of a dossier and a 
preference for written evidence over live testimony.  Neverthe-
less, the procedure at the Tribunal still retains some measure 
of its adversarial origins as the investigation stage remains 
party-driven, and the prosecution and defense set their own 
course of investigation - clearly differing from the official inves-
tigation of a true inquisitorial system.  As will be addressed in 
Part V, this is significant for placing this court within the pro-
cedural spectrum outlined in Part I(c). 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT  
a. Procedural History at the ICC 
The ICC was borne out of entirely different circumstances 
from the ICTY, and instead of being a reactive, ad hoc, tribu-
nal, years of planning, debate and discussion were invested re-
garding the formation of a single international court capable of 
holding individuals criminally responsible for individual acts.137  
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the International 
Criminal Court and its procedure is that since its inception, 
and in contrast to the ICTY, it has been a “unique compro-
mise”138 between adversarial and inquisitorial systems. The 
drafters of the Rome Statute chose to leave the exact details of 
the compromise to be determined by the judges, giving them 
wide capacities to select the most appropriate procedural tools 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 See e.g. Michael P. Scharf, Politics behind U.S. Opposition to the In-
ternational Criminal Court, The, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 97 (1999); John 
Dugard, Obstacles in the Way of an International Criminal Court, 56 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 329 (1997); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Establishing an Interna-
tional Criminal Court: Historical Survey, 149 MIL. L. REV. 49 (1995). 
138 Kress, supra note 1. 
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from the different systems.139  
The authority for judge-led creation of rules is found in Ar-
ticle 51 of the Rome Statute, which provides that, in urgent 
cases and where the Rules do not provide for a specific situa-
tion before the Court, the judges may draw up provisional 
Rules to be applied until adopted, amended or rejected by the 
next ordinary or special section of the Assembly of States Par-
ties.140  On its face, this is a limited power, but in practice the 
judges enjoy very broad authority to create appropriate rules of 
procedure befitting the circumstances before it. 
b. Structural Shifts and Power Distribution at the ICC 
Once again, if we take the pure adversarial model as our 
baseline then an examination of the Rome Statute and RPEs of 
the ICC evidences a significant shift in favor of inquisitorial 
practices.  This is so of the roles ascribed the individual parties, 
and especially the judge.  What are particularly interesting are 
the dual roles of the prosecutor and Pre-Trial judge during the 
investigation stage, which has a heavy inquisitorial influence. 
At the ICC the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is responsi-
ble for all initial investigation,141 playing a role somewhat fa-
miliar to the official investigator.  As in the inquisitorial sys-
tem, the OTP is obliged to investigate all inculpatory and 
exculpatory evidence,142 which moves it beyond the require-
ments of incumbent on the OTP at the ICTY and places an ac-
tive requirement on the ICC OTP to unearth any exculpatory 
evidence.143  Unlike at the ICTY, which had a very specific 
mandate from the Security Council, the ICC has the power to 
investigate in number of different instances.  The investigative 
power of the OTP can be triggered one of three ways under Ar-
ticle 13 of the Rome Statute, either by referral by a State Par-
ty, referral by the Security Council or via an investigation pro-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Kress, supra note 1 at 605.      
140 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
3 Article 51(3), July 17, 1998. 
141 Id.  art. 53 
142 Id.   art. 54(1)(a). 
143 The defense also conducts its own investigation, which the Registrar 
can assist with, as appropriate. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ICC-ASP/1/3 Rule 20(1)(b) (2002). 
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prio motu.144 Additionally, when deciding whether to initiate an 
investigation, the prosecutor must consider whether the infor-
mation provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being com-
mitted, whether the case would be admissible under Article 17 
of the Rome Statute,145 and whether there are other substantial 
reasons to consider that an investigation would not be in the 
interests of justice.146  
The procedure at the ICC has a two-fold approach to inves-
tigation: first the prosecutor has the capacity to decide whether 
to proceed with an investigation; second, the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber (PTC) must grant an authorization for that investigation.147 
Requiring this authorization from a judicial body significantly 
restrains the discretion of the prosecutor, a discretion that 
would be in the prosecutor’s exclusive domain in an adversarial 
system. Indeed, the relationship between the prosecutor and 
the Pre-Trial Chamber at this stage of the proceedings has 
been called “one of the most striking examples of the unique-
ness of the ICC procedural law.”148  
The Prosecutor has described the “interplay between the 
Pre-Trial Chamber and the prosecution [as] a sensitive matter 
that lies at the heart of the compromise reached in Rome be-
tween different legal traditions and values, and must be ap-
proached with utmost caution.”149  Imbuing in the judge the 
power of authorization is one of the striking examples in ICC 
procedure of the power shift that has taken place in ICP.  Re-
quiring authorization as a prerequisite for an investigation to 
proceed moves exclusive discretion of investigation and prose-
cution out of the hands of the prosecutor in a pure adversarial 
system.  Instead the judge is given enormous power to influ-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
3,  Article. 13, July 17, 1998.  
145  Id.  article 17 
146 Id. art. 53(1)(a)–(c). 
147 Id. art. 15(3).; see also The Structure of International Criminal Proce-
dure, supra note 1 at 433. 
148 Kress, supra note 1 at 606. 
149 The Structure of International Criminal Procedure, supra note 1 at 
443 citing Situation in The Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Position on Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 17 February 2005 Decision to 
Convene a Status Conference, ICC-01/04 2 (9 March 2005). 
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ence which cases move to the full investigation stage, which is 
more aligned with the active role of a judge as official investi-
gator in an inquisitorial system.  
During this judicial authorization request process, and in 
making its determination of viability, the PTC examines the 
request and supporting materials submitted by the prosecutor.  
At this stage the PTC may request additional information from 
the prosecutor as well as any victims who make representa-
tions, and may even hold a hearing if they consider it neces-
sary,150 before determining whether there is indeed a reasona-
ble basis to proceed.151  In issuing their decision, the PTC must 
include it’s reasoning, and must notify the victims of the deci-
sion.152 
Hand in hand with the unique condition of judicial author-
ization is the procedural power of review instilled in the PTC at 
the ICC under Article 53 of the Rome Statute.153  Article 53 
subjects the OTP’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion in decid-
ing whether to proceed with an investigation (a pure adversar-
ial norm) to judicial review in limited circumstances, depending 
on the basis upon which the prosecutor has declined the inves-
tigation.  This is another prominent example of a power shift 
along the spectrum in ICP, and one which places more power in 
the hands of the judicial organ than would ever be found in a 
pure adversarial system.  
It must be noted that PTC’s power of review is not abso-
lute.  For example, when the prosecutor declines to investigate 
based on Article 53(1) or (2) of the Rome Statute, the PTC’s re-
view power can only be triggered by the request of a State,154 
and it is only if a State requests such that the PTC can ask the 
prosecutor to review its decision not to investigate.155  In this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, Rule 50(4). 
151 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
3, Article 15(3)–(4) July 17, 1998 
152 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, Rule 50(5). 
153 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 U.N.T.S.  
3 Article 53 July 17, 1998. 
154 Id. art. 53(3)(a). 
155 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT Rule 108(2). 
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instance, if the prosecutor once again declines to proceed with 
the investigation then there is no further recourse available to 
the PTC to order the investigation. 
The PTC has much broader powers of review when the 
prosecutor declines to prosecute on the basis of Article 53(3) as 
in that case the PTC can request on their own initiative that 
the prosecutor review its decision not to investigate.156  If the 
PTC draws a contrary conclusion to the prosecutor then the de-
cision by the OTP not to proceed is invalidated,157 and the pros-
ecutor shall be obliged to continue with the investigation or 
prosecution.158  This provides the PTC with the means by which 
they can compel an investigation to take place.159  This power of 
review by a judicial chamber has its origins in the inquisitorial 
system and represents a transfer of power from the prosecutor 
to that judicial organ.  Under a pure inquisitorial system, the 
judge is one of the arms of the ‘official investigator’ and there-
fore has the power to compel that a case be tried before the 
court.  While these ICC Pre-Trial Chamber powers under Arti-
cle 53 do not entirely embody a pure inquisitorial model (be-
cause the PTC is not part of the ‘official investigation’ body), 
echoes of inquisitorial logic can be found in the purpose of the 
Article 53 power. 
A further interesting competence of the PTC at the ICC re-
lates to its ability to override the principle of complementari-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
3, Article 53(3)(b) July 17, 1998. 
157 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
3, Article 53(3)(b) July 17, 1998. 
158 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, Rule 110(2). 
159Although the prosecutor is the arbitrator of a large measure of the in-
vestigatory powers, it is obliged to request certain measures from the Pre-
Trial Chamber.  In this way, the Pre-Trial Chamber retains some power, or 
at least oversight, over the investigatory process.  When the prosecutor finds 
it necessary to collect evidence in the territory of a State Party she must 
communicate a written request to the State Party.  This is not merely a pro-
cedural show, rather has the Pre-Trial Chamber has some actual powers, and 
can invite the views of the State Party at issue, and can even hold a hearing.  
When coming to its decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber takes the State Party 
opinion into consideration and can ultimately grant or decline the authoriza-
tion. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT,  Rule 115. 
31
6. JESSICA PEAKE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/14  8:08 PM 
2014] SPECTRUM OF INT’L CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 213 
ty.160  This is one of the unique operating principles of the ICC 
and requires the prosecutor to notify the State that would nor-
mally exercise jurisdiction over the issue when a situation is 
referred to it and to defer to State investigation if the State re-
quests it.161  In certain circumstances, the OTP may request to 
continue an investigation despite a domestic investigation and 
the PTC has the power to grant that request.162  In acting on 
the prosecutor’s request, the Pre-Trial Chamber decides on the 
procedure to be followed, and can elect to have a hearing.163  
Both the ultimate decision and its rationale must be communi-
cated to the prosecutor and the State requesting the deferral.164 
The Rome Statute also envisages a unique investigatory 
tool for the Pre-Trial Chamber, which is not seen at other in-
ternational courts.165 This device comes into play when a situa-
tion is recognized by the prosecutor, which may not be subse-
quently available for the purpose of trial, whereupon the 
prosecutor can request from the PTC the opportunity to “take 
testimony or a statement from a witness, or to examine, collect 
or test evidence.”166 The prosecutor is only permitted to exercise 
this function with the approval of the Pre-Trial Chamber, and 
the Pre-Trial Chamber may “take such measures as may be 
necessary to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the proceed-
ings and, in particular, to protect the rights of the defense.”167 
Such measures may include recommending or ordering a par-
ticular procedure be followed,168 requiring a record be made of 
the proceedings,169 or sending a judge to observe and make rec-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 U.N.T.S.  
3, Article 18(2) July 17, 1998. 
161 Id. art. 18(2). 
162  Id. art. 18(2). 
163 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT Rule 55(1). 
164 Id.  Rule 55(3). 
165 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 U.N.T.S.  
3, Article 56(1)(a) July 17, 1998. 
166 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 U.N.T.S.  
3, Article 56(1)(a) July 17, 1998. 
167 Id. at Article 56(1)(b).; RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,  Rule 47. 
168 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
3, Article 56(2)(a) July 17, 1998. 
169 Id. art. 56(2)(b). 
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ommendations regarding the collection and preservation of evi-
dence and questioning.170  This is a function entirely unfamiliar 
to the pure adversarial system.  Neither is it a feature com-
monly found in the inquisitorial system, but the judicial in-
volvement at this stage of proceeding is more closely aligned to 
the inquisitorial process, particularly the facility enabling the 
judge to observe the proceedings, which, it is suggested, mir-
rors the judge’s involvement in the inquisitorial official investi-
gation.  A secondary function of PTC involvement at the inves-
tigation stage is that it enables the Chamber to ensure the 
rights of the defense are upheld, otherwise the defense would 
have no representation in those interactions. 
Another pre-trial control mechanism exercisable by the 
PTC at the ICC is its ability to schedule and conduct status 
conferences. 171  These conferences are similar in purpose to 
those held by the ICTY pre-trial judge and are intended to ena-
ble the judge to assist with the progression of the trial. This 
ensures that the trial disclosure is taking place under satisfac-
tory conditions,172 which is a departure from pure adversarial 
standards.  One judge from the Pre-Trial Chamber is designat-
ed to organize these conferences, which can occur at the judge’s 
own motion or at the request of the prosecutor or accused per-
son.173  All of these judicial powers permit the judge to super-
vise the prosecutor and monitor the exercise of her discretion in 
the conduct of the investigation.  In an inquisitorially influ-
enced system where the prosecutor holds the bulk of investiga-
tory powers, this is important in order for the defense not to 
feel at a chronic disadvantage. It is vital that the prosecutor’s 
powers be kept in check and that there is supervision to ensure 
the prosecutor is executing her functions in the interests of 
both parties.174   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Id.  art. 56(2)(e). 
171 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, Rule 121(2)(b). 
172 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT,  Rule 121(2)(b). 
173 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT,  Rule 121(2)(b). 
174 See generally Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and 
Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal 
Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510 (2003); see also Andrew J. Walker, When a Good 
Idea Is Poorly Implemented: How the International Criminal Court Fails to 
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The prosecutor’s role at the ICC is more akin to an official 
investigator in the inquisitorial system, as the OTP is intended 
to operate as an independent and impartial body, investigating 
both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence equally. This is a 
stark departure from a prosecutor in a pure adversarial sys-
tem;  however, as discussed above, the judicial authorization 
requirement at the ICC is a divergence from a pure inquisitori-
al system.  The system of ICP at the ICC puts the judge in a 
supervisory role, giving the judge the power to review the deci-
sions of the OTP in certain circumstances, in contrast to the 
pure inquisitorial system where both the judge and prosecutor 
act in concert with each other in their shared role as an inves-
tigating official.     
The overall role of the Pre-Trial Chamber is inquisitorial 
in origin, and Miraglia suggests that the manifestation of the 
powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber has moved its role in the di-
rection of investigative judging, a far departure from the pas-
sive, adversarial judge on which the ICP was originally mod-
eled.175  During the pre-trial phase, the PTC has an array of 
powers at its disposal, for example, dealing with applications 
for interim releases pending trial by detained persons,176 which 
shall be periodically reviewed.177  The PTC is also responsible 
for setting the date of the confirmation of charges hearing,178 
where it confirms the charges on which the prosecutor intends 
to seek trial.179     
The requirement of a confirmation hearing was directly in-
spired by the inquisitorial French system’s chambre 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Be Insulated from International Politics and to Protect Basic Due Process 
Guarantees, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 245 (2004); see Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Polic-
ing International Prosecutors, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 175 (2012). 
175 See generally Michela Miraglia, The First Decision of the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber: International Criminal Procedure Under Construction, 4 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 188, 193 (2006). 
176  See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 Article 60(2), July 17, 1998. 
177 See id. art. 60(3). 
178 See RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, ICC-ASP/1/3 Rule 121(1) (within a reasonable time follow-
ing appearance by the accused). 
179 See generally ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 Article 61(1), July 17, 1998. 
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d’accusation.180  At this stage, the ICC PTC determines wheth-
er there is “sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds 
to believe that the person committed each of the crimes 
charged,”181 and can either confirm the charges and commit the 
person to a Trial Chamber for trial,182 decline the charges for 
insufficient evidence,183 or adjourn and request further evidence 
or investigation from the prosecutor. It can also suggest the 
prosecutor amend the charge to a different crime.184  These 
powers are entirely unfamiliar to a pure adversarial system, 
which does not have the requirement of a pre-trial hearing. 
Yet, neither do they entirely emulate a pure inquisitorial sys-
tem.  Indeed, Ambos states, “ICC confirmation procedure is a 
compromise that combines several elements of different sys-
tems of pretrial procedures but does not imitate one of them 
completely.”185 
It is not only in the Pre-trial stages that the judge is in-
stilled with significant powers; the trial stages are also full of 
compromises between the two ends of the procedural spectrum.   
Following the confirmation of charges hearing, the Presidency 
of the ICC convenes a Trial Chamber, at which stage responsi-
bility for the conduct of proceedings passes from the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber to the Trial Chamber.186  The Trial Chamber 
confers with the parties and adopts procedures to ensure a fair 
and expeditious trial, can require disclosure of “documents or 
information not previously disclosed, sufficiently in advance of 
the commencement of the trial to enable adequate preparation 
for trial,”187 and, up until the start of trial, the Trial Chamber 
can schedule status conferences.188  Both prior to and during 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 See Kress, supra note 1 at 610. 
181 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
3 Article 61(7), July 17, 1998. 
182 See Id. art. 61(7)(a). 
183 See Id. art. 61(7)(b). 
184 See Id. art. 61(7)(c). 
185 Ambos, supra note 1, at 455. 
186 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
3 Article 61(11), July 17, 1998. (However, this does not necessarily mark the 
end of the Pre-Trial Chamber involvement, as the Trial Chamber may con-
tinue to refer preliminary issues to the Pre-Trial Chamber. See id. Rule 
64(4).) 
187 See Id. art. 64(3). Id. art. 65(3)(c). 
188 See RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
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trial, the Trial Chamber may require the attendance and tes-
timony of witnesses and the production of documents and evi-
dence, and require State assistance in doing so, if necessary.189  
The Judge may also order disclosure of documents not previ-
ously disclosed to the other party.190  The Presiding Judge has 
the power to give directions for the conduct of proceedings,191 
and can, either on the application of a party or its own motion, 
“rule on the admissibility or relevance of evidence and take all 
necessary steps to maintain order . . . .”192 Proceedings and the 
presentation of evidence generally follow the adversarial ex-
ample, with the prosecution presenting its full case followed by 
the presentation of the full defense case; however, the Chamber 
is able to give directions for the conduct of proceedings, which 
can influence the presentation order.193  Where the Chamber 
declines to give such directions, the parties retain discretion 
over the presentation of witnesses and evidence.194 
At the ICC, the accused is free to admit guilt; however, this 
is different to the concept of a guilty plea found in the adver-
sarial system.  In the adversarial system, if an accused admits 
guilt, the prosecution and defense would work together to reach 
a compromise in sentencing to propose to the judge.195  In con-
trast, if an accused admits guilt at the ICC and the Trial 
Chamber is not satisfied that the accused has made it voluntar-
ily, cognizant of the nature and consequences of that admis-
sion, and that the guilt is not supported by the facts,196 the 
Chamber can disregard the admission, order the trial be con-
tinued under ordinary trial procedures, and may remit the case 
to another Trial Chamber.197  The parallels with the inquisito-
rial system here are noticeable, as the inquisitorial system does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
CRIMINAL Court, ICC-ASP/1/3 Rule 132(2).  
189 See generally ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 Article 64(6)(b), July 17, 1998.  
190 See Id. art. 64(3)(c). 
191 See Id. art. 64(8)(b). 
192 Id. art. 64(9). 
193 See generally Id. art. 64(8)(b). 
194 See generally RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ICC-ASP/1/3 Rule 140(1). 
195 Cassese, supra note 15 at 370. 
196 See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 Article 65(1), July 17, 1998. 
197 See Id. art. 65(3). 
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not accept guilty pleas and instead requires a full and impar-
tial official investigation regardless of the professed guilt of the 
accused.  However, the ICC does not entirely integrate inquisi-
torial norms; if the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the re-
quirements of Article 65(1)198 are met, the Trial Chamber can 
“consider the admission of guilt, together with any additional 
evidence presented, as establishing all the essential facts that 
are required to prove the crime to which the admission of guilt 
relates, and may convict the accused of that crime.”199  
Another inquisitorial mechanism that has found traction 
at the ICC is the concept of a dossier.  At the ICC, the Registrar 
is tasked with compiling complete records of all the particulars 
of each case,200 and the Trial Chamber is required to ensure 
that the Registrar makes a complete and accurate record of the 
proceedings;201  however, neither the ICC Statute nor RPEs 
provide for anything as comprehensive as a true inquisitorial 
dossier.   
Although a case file or dossier is an inquisitorial mecha-
nism, the method of collection of the relevant documents at the 
ICC embodies the adversarial approach to disclosure, requiring 
continuing disclosure throughout the trial process, include 
pre202 and during,203 rather than all disclosure prior to trial.  
This draws an interesting comparison between the adversarial 
and inquisitorial systems204 and how different international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 See id. art. 65(1). 
199 Id. art. 65(2). 
200 See RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, ICC-ASP/1/3 Rule 15. 
201 See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 Article 64(10), July 17, 1998. . 
202 See generally id. art. 61(3). 
203 Id. art. 67(2). 
204 See e.g., Walpin, supra note 32 at 176; see  e.g.,  generally Kevin C. 
McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethics Standards Different, 68 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1453 (1999); see e.g.,  Michael K. Block, Jeffrey S. Parker & Libor Dusek, 
Experimental Comparison of Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Procedural Re-
gimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 170 (2000); see e.g., John C. Koski, From Hide-
and-Seek to Show-and-Tell: Evidentiary Disclosure Rules, 17 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 497 (1993); sse e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the American Ad-
versarial System to Protect the Innocent and Conceptual Advantages in the 
Inquisitorial Design for Investigative Fairness, 36 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
319 (2010); see Finegan, supra note 12; see Langer, supra note 121; see e.g., 
Felicity Nagorcka, Michael Stanton & Michael Wilson, Stranded between 
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courts have chosen to deal with disclosure issues.205  
Similar to the ICTY, and corresponding to the inquisitorial 
preference, the ICC relies on professional judges elected from 
“among persons of high moral character, impartiality and in-
tegrity who possess the qualification required in their respec-
tive State for appointments to the highest judicial offices.”206  
Moreover, the ICC particularly requires that its judges have an 
established competence in criminal law and procedure and the 
relevant areas of international law, such as humanitarian law 
and human rights.207  The statute provides that the judges will 
be assigned to Chambers such that belie their experience,208 
and are expected to act with impartiality.209  Hand in hand 
with the professionalized judiciary is the preference against 
technical rules of evidence at the ICC.  Similar to the inquisito-
rial system, technical rules are thought to be superfluous to the 
procedural system of the court, as professional judges ought to 
be capable of ignoring inadmissible evidence.  In accordance 
with Article 69(4) of the Rome Statute, the parties may submit 
any evidence relevant to the case that is of probative value and 
not prejudicial to a fair trial or fair evaluation of the testimony 
of a witness.210  The judges must disregard evidence as inad-
missible if obtained by violation of the Rome Statute or inter-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Partisanship and the Truth - A Comparative Analysis of Legal Ethics in the 
Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Justice, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 448 
(2005); see e.g., Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form, and Function: The 
Search for Truth and the Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarial and Inquisito-
rial Justice Systems, 12 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 185 (2001); see e.g., Geraldine 
Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from 
Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 165 (2004). 
205 See e.g., M. Caianiello, Disclosure before the ICC: the emergence of a 
new form of policies implementation system in international criminal justice?, 
10 INT’L CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 23 (2010); see e.g., D. Scheffer, A review of the 
experiences of the pre-trial and appeals chambers of the International Crimi-
nal Court regarding the disclosure of evidence, 21 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (2008); see e.g., Bernhard Kuschnik, International 
Criminal Due Process in the Makings: New Tendencies in the Law of Non-
Disclosure in the Proceedings before the ICC, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 157 (2009). 
206 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
3 Article 36(3)(a), July 17, 1998.  
207 Id. art. 36(3)(b). 
208 See generally Id. art. 39. 
209 Id. art. 40. 
210 Id. art. 69(4). 
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national human rights treaties, particularly if it casts substan-
tial doubt on the reliability of the evidence, or if the admission 
of such would be damaging to the integrity of the proceed-
ings.211 It is assumed that the judges are legally qualified to de-
termine what is, or is not, admissible before them, and have 
the integrity to make a determination to the contrary when the 
interests of justice so require.212 
The Statute and RPE’s of the ICC are characterized by a 
pull towards inquisitorially influenced mechanisms and away 
from the framework of the pure adversarial system that this 
paper is predicated on;  however, as evidenced above, the ICC 
does not fully embrace inquisitorial norms and several of the 
procedural developments at the ICC are unique.  Some of these 
unique features, such as the review and authorization function 
of the PTC, seem to go beyond the scale between pure adversar-
ial and pure inquisitorial and embody an entirely new proce-
dure, with features not found in either pure system.  These de-
velopments will be compared to other courts in Part V, 
immediately following a discussion of influences and develop-
ments at the ECCC. 
IV. THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF 
CAMBODIA 
a. Procedural History at the ECCC 
The establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) was approached from a different 
starting point than both the ICTY and the ICC. From its incep-
tion, the Court was designed as a hybrid of both national and 
international law to combine elements of domestic inquisitorial 
Cambodian law with international law and legal standards.213  
There was much political wrangling and negotiation be-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Id. art. 69(7). 
212See generally SAFFERLING, supra note 43 at 293–296. 
213 See generally Robert Petit, Lawfare and International Tribunals: A 
Question of Definition: A Reflection on the Creation of the Khmer Rouge Tri-
bunal, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 189 (2010); see e.g., Hanna Bertelman, In-
ternational Standards and National Ownership - Judicial Independence in 
Hybrid Courts: The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 79 
NORDIC J. INT’L L. 341 (2010). 
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tween the Royal Government of Cambodia and the United Na-
tions in determining what law would govern the proceedings. 
Throughout negotiations, the Cambodian Government insisted 
that the tribunal should be created within the existing national 
law and court system, modeled on French civil law, with inter-
national support being provided via the United Nations.  The 
United Nations (UN) demanded the reverse, insisting on an in-
ternational court with national participation.214  The UN’s ra-
tionale for its position was the belief that the Cambodian Gov-
ernment was incapable of meeting the basic international 
standards of fairness expected from, and required by, a UN 
court.  The international community was similarly concerned 
that the Cambodian Government did not recognize that the 
UN’s demands for independence, impartiality, and objectivity 
of the tribunal were legitimate.215  Fortunately, those concerns 
were overcome and a compromise was reached. That compro-
mise was a hybrid court, marrying both domestic and interna-
tional processes and proceedings.216   
The interplay between domestic and international law is 
observed in the two principal founding documents of the Court; 
the Agreement between the United Nations and the Govern-
ment of Cambodia217 and the ECCC Law, adopted by the Cam-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 See generally William W Burke-White, Community of Courts: Toward 
a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 20, 
30–41 (2002). 
215 Hans Corell, NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UN AND CAMBODIA 
REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COURT TO TRY KHMER ROUGE LEADERS, 
STATEMENT BY UN LEGAL COUNSEL HANS CORELL AT A PRESS BRIEFING AT UN 
HEADQUARTERS IN NEW YORK (2002), 
http://www.un.org/news/dh/infocus/cambodia/corell-brief.htm. (The UN even 
withdrew from negotiations in 2002, as their concerns were not alleviated.).   
216 See generally Kathleen Claussen, Up To The Bar: Designing the Hy-
brid Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 253 (2008); See 
generally Robert Petit & Anees Ahmed, A Review of the Jurisprudence of the 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS 165–89 (2010); See generally 
Neha Jain, Conceptualising Internationalisation in Hybrid Criminal Courts, 
12 SINGAPORE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 81–95 (2008); See generally 
Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Teething Phase of the ECCC, 10 CHINESE JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 469–502 (2011). 
217 Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes 
Committed During the Period of the Democratic Kampuchea, (2003) Funda-
mental to the eventual Agreement was the application of both national and 
international law, and staffing by Cambodian nationals alongside interna-
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/6
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bodian Parliament in 2001, and amended in 2004.218 Article 12 
of the Agreement makes Cambodian domestic law the applica-
ble procedure at the ECCC;219 however, in anticipation of prob-
lems of interpretation and application of that law, the article 
provides that, “guidance may be sought [from] procedural rules 
established at the international level,”220 in line with, “interna-
tional standards of justice, fairness and due process of law.”221  
There are also extensive supplemental Internal Rules of the 
Court, which have gone through numerous revisions since their 
initial adoption in 2007.222 
The result of this amalgamation of two distinct bodies of 
law - national and international - in a single court has been the 
creation of what the Co-Investigating Judges have termed a 
“special internationalized tribunal”.223  The Chamber has been 
designed within the existing court structure in Cambodia; yet, 
the Trial Chamber has been keen on emphasizing that it is a, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
tional staff. 
218 LAW ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE 
COURTS OF CAMBODIA FOR THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMES COMMITTED DURING 
THE PERIOD OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, WITH INCLUSION OF AMENDMENTS, 
(2004). 
219 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ROYAL 
GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA CONCERNING THE PROSECUTION UNDER CAMBODIAN 
LAW OF CRIMES COMMITTED DURING THE PERIOD OF THE DEMOCRATIC 
KAMPUCHEA, supra note 216 at Art. 12. 
220 Id. art. 12(1) 
221 Id. art. 12(2) (Cambodian criminal procedure has been reformed with 
the adoption with the Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure 2007). 
222 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules, 
(2007) [hereinafter “ECCC Rules”] The Agreement and the law were fleshed 
out by Internal Rules debated and adopted by a ‘Plenary’, comprising of all 
the permanent and reserve judges, permanent and reserve Co-Prosecutors, 
the head of the Defense Support Section, the head of the Victims Unit, and 
the head of the Office of Administration.  The first set Internal Rules 
(“Rules”) were adopted on June 12, 2007, and since then the Rules have gone 
through several ‘Plenary’ sessions, resulting in multiple amendments.  This 
has resulted in substantial development of the procedural law of the Court, 
and contribution to international criminal procedure as a whole.  The purpose 
of the Internal Rules is “to consolidate applicable Cambodian procedure for 
proceedings before the ECCC and… to adopt additional rules where these ex-
isting procedures do not deal with a particular matter, or if there is uncer-
tainty regarding their interpretation or application, or if there is a question 
regarding their consistency with international standards.” Internal Rules, 
Preamble. 
223 Office of the Co-Investigating Judges Order of Provisional Detention 
(KAING Guek Eav alias Duch), (2007). 
41
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“separately constituted, independent and internationalized 
court,”224 with a, “special and independent character within the 
Cambodian legal system . . . designed to stand apart from exist-
ing Cambodian courts and rule exclusively on a narrowly-
defined group of defendants for specific crimes within a limited 
period.”225 The Court has also sought to distinguish the proce-
dure used by the ECCC from the domestic Cambodian proce-
dure, stating that it has a, “self-contained regime of procedural 
law [to align with its] unique circumstances.”226    
b. Structural Shifts and Power Distribution at the ECCC 
Given the unique circumstances of the ECCC’s creation as 
an intentional national/international hybrid court, making ob-
servations using a pure adversarial baseline may seem impru-
dent; however, it must be recalled that the purpose of this arti-
cle is to look at the developments of international criminal 
procedure, which has its origins in the adversarial, and it is in 
that context that we are examining the ECCC.  An analysis of 
this court will provide a useful point of comparison in Part V 
when we examine where on the procedural scale the different 
courts can be charted, and which competing procedural devices 
they have chosen to draw upon.   
Resulting from its roots in Cambodian domestic inquisito-
rial procedure, the ECCC has a unique feature not found in any 
of the other international courts:227 a traditional inquisitorial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Decision of the Trial Chamber on Duch’s Request for Release, (2009) 
available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/ 
Order_of_Provisional_Detention-DUCH-EN.pdf. 
225 Decision on request for release of Kaing Guek Eav on 15 Jun 2009, 
Case No. 001/18-7-2007-ECCC-TC, § 10. 
226 Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on Nuon Chea Appeal Against Order Re-
fusing Request for Annulment, ¶14 (2008) available at 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/D55_I_8_EN_0.
pdf (The Court itself has been eager to distinguish and distance itself as “en-
tirely self-contained” from the other domestic proceedings of the Courts of 
Cambodia “from the commencement of investigations through to the deter-
mination of appeals.” Furthermore, the acts of the tribunal are not subject to 
the review of other courts, nor do they review proceedings of other domestic 
courts of Cambodia. Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on Appeal Against Provi-
sional Detention Order of Kiang Guek Eav alias Duch, 18–19 (2007)). 
227 Guido Acquaviva, New Paths in International Criminal Justice?  The 
Internal Rules of the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers, 6 J. INT. CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 129–51, 140 (2008) (Moreover, such an office has not been contem-
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/6
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feature that removes investigatory powers from the prosecution 
and defense found in a pure adversarial system, instead plac-
ing those powers in the hands of an impartial judicial investi-
gator – the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges (OCIJ).228  The 
ECCC OCIJ is an independent office within the Court229 tasked 
with investigating the truth and, as such, is required to identi-
fy both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence,230 playing the 
role of the inquisitorial investigating official; however, the 
OCIJ is not free to wield its power unrestricted. Rather, it must 
act within the confines set out by the Co-Prosecutor in its in-
troductory submission.231  
Once the introductory submission is handed to the OCIJ, 
that office takes control of the investigatory process and from 
that point forward the OCIJ dictates the investigation (from 
which crime sites are examined to what evidence is collected 
and which witnesses are interviewed).232  During its investiga-
tion, the OCIJ has the power to interview the charged per-
son,233 civil party,234 and any witness,235 and is able to control 
when those interviews take place.  The Co-Prosecutors and the 
defense236 may request the OCIJ to undertake investigations or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
plated at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which also has foundations in the 
inquisitorial system, Cecile Aptel, Some Innovations in the Statute of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 JOURNAL 1107 (2007)). 
228 Acquaviva, supra note 226 at 135; Jerome de Hemptinne, The Crea-
tion of Investigating Chambers at the International Criminal Court: An Op-
tion Worth Pursuing?, J. INT. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 402–18 (2007). 
229 ECCC Rules, Rule 14(1).  
230 See generally LAW ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY 
CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA FOR THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMES 
COMMITTED DURING THE PERIOD OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, WITH INCLUSION 
OF AMENDMENTS, supra note 216 art. 23new (The OCIJ should not be confused 
with more familiar ideas of pre-trial management seen at the ICTY and the 
ICC carried out by a pre-trial judge. The OCIJ plays a separate, very distinct 
role even before the pre-trial process as understood in the traditional sense) 
begins; indeed it can be said they are operating pre pre-trial.).    
231 ECCC Rules, Rule 53.  
232 See Id. Rule 55(5). 
233 See Id. Rule 58. 
234 See Id. Rule 59. 
235 See Id. Rule 60. 
236 Id. Rule 58(6).  (“At any time during an investigation, the Charged 
Person may request the Co-Investigating Judges to interview him or her, 
question witnesses, go to a site, order expertise or collect other evidence on 
his or her behalf.” The OCIJ also has the power to reject such a request, how-
ever, if it does it is required to provide factual reasons for doing so.)   
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make any such orders, as they consider useful for the investi-
gation; however it is well within the power of the OCIJ to reject 
such a request.237  
The OCIJ has an array of procedural powers at its dispos-
al, which it may exercise at its own initiative to enable execu-
tion of its responsibilities to investigate, including issuing 
summons, arrest warrants and detention orders.238  The OCIJ 
may also delegate powers to the Judicial Police or ECCC Inves-
tigators via a Rogatory Letter to assist with their investiga-
tions,239 and those bodies remain under the supervision of the 
Co-Investigating Judges.240  The OCIJ concludes its investiga-
tion by issuing a Closing Order, in which they can either indict 
a Charged Person and send them to trial, or dismiss the case.241  
When an indictment is issued in the closing order, it forms the 
basis of the trial and limits the facts that may be considered in 
relation to each charge and crime base.242 
The OCIJ represents one of the compromises reached be-
tween the Cambodian Government and the international nego-
tiators when bargaining for applicable procedure before the 
court and was the workable solution found acceptable to both 
sides. Vesting investigatory powers in an independent judicial 
office retained that inquisitorial element in the hybrid system, 
and was more amenable to adversarial lawyers than having 
those full powers of investigation rest with the prosecutor 
alone.243 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Id. Rule 55(10).  If the OCIJ rejects a request they are required to is-
sue a rejection order “as soon as possible and, in any event, before to the end 
of the judicial investigation”  
238 See Id. Rule 55(5). 
239 See Id. Rule 14(1); see id. Rule 55(9); see Id. Rule 62(1) (A Rogatory 
Letter requires investigative action by judicial police or investigators.); see id. 
Rule 62(2) (“A Rogatory Letter shall not be issued in a general form, and 
shall clearly specify the nature of investigative work to be done, which must 
relate directly to the crime or crimes under investigation. The Co-
Investigating Judges shall set the time limit for compliance with a Rogatory 
Letter. The Rogatory Letter must be signed and dated by the Co-
Investigating Judges. They may withdraw a Rogatory Letter at any time.”). 
240 See Id. Rule 62. 
241 See Id. Rule 67(1). 
242 See Id. Rule 67. 
243 It is tremendously important in this confidential evidence gathering 
system that the judges be seen to be impartial and independent. See Suzan-
nah Linton, Safeguarding the Independence and Impartiality of the Cambo-
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/6
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In keeping with an inquisitorial system of pre-trial man-
agement, the system at the ECCC also provides pre-trial pro-
cedural powers exercisable by the Trial Chamber.244   These 
powers, under Rule 80 of the ECCC Internal Rules, are intend-
ed to assist with the preparation of the trial and allow the Trial 
Chamber to manage the proceedings to trial.245 Each party to 
the proceedings, which at the ECCC includes Civil Parties (an-
other inquisitorial adoption),246 must submit witness lists to the 
Greffier (a traditional feature of the French inquisitorial sys-
tem), who communicates these lists to the Trial Chamber.247.  
To allow the judges to manage proceedings effectively, the 
Chamber may require the parties to file additional documents, 
such as, the factual basis of witness testimony, points of the in-
dictment on which a witness will testify, and the estimated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
dian Extraordinary Chambers, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 327 (2006). 
244 See generally ECCC Rules § D – Pre–Trial Chamber Proceedings; see 
id. Rule 71-72, 74 (The role of the Pre-Trial Chamber at the ECCC is limited 
to adjudging on points of dispute between the Co-Prosecutors and Co-
Investigating Judges, and to ruling on issues appealed by the parties against 
orders made by the OCIJ. The Pre-Trial Chamber does not interact with the 
parties on matters of management, such as scheduling, which is a departure 
from other models seen at other international criminal courts, and the system 
more generally thought of under a managerial judging model.); see id. Rule 
77(3) (At the ECCC, once an appeal is referred, the Pre-Trial Chamber Gref-
fiers receives the Case File from the OCIJ Greffiers, and the President of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber must verify the Case File is up to date and set a date for 
the hearing.); see id. Rule 77(4) (The Co-Prosecutors and lawyers for the par-
ties may consult the case file up until the date of hearing.  They are required 
to file their pleadings with the Greffier of the Pre-Trial Chamber in order for 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to have sufficient information to rule on the dispute.) 
Even though the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber is different to its role at the 
ICTY, managerial judging elements are still utilized, as the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber judge is required to have a sophisticated level of knowledge about the 
proceedings in order to enable them to rule on the dispute. 
245 See id. Rule 80. 
246 See Caroline Ehlert & Christine Kaufmann, Duch Trial at the Ex-
traordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia - Involving the Cambodians 
in the Process, The, 28 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 22 (2010); see 
Alain Werner & Daniella Rudy, Civil Party Representation at the ECCC: 
Sounding the Retreat in International Criminal Law, 8 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. 
RTS. 301 (2009); see Kate Yesberg, Accessing Justice through Victim Partici-
pation at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 40 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 555 
(2009); see James P. Bair, From the Numbers Who Died to Those Who Sur-
vived: Victim Participation in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 507 (2008). 
247 See ECCC Rules, Rule 80(1). 
45
6. JESSICA PEAKE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/24/14  8:08 PM 
2014] SPECTRUM OF INT’L CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 227 
time required for the testimony of each witness.248  The Trial 
Chamber may also require the parties to submit exhibit lists 
with accompanying descriptions,249 any legal issues the parties 
intend to raise at the initial hearing,250 and a list of facts un-
contested between the parties.251  Again, many of these re-
quirements may seem alien to an adversarial lawyer, as it 
means that the defense can see the cards the prosecution in-
tends to lay on the table during trial; however, it is a common 
feature of an inquisitorial system and goes to the basic premise 
of the inquisitorial trial’s truth determining function.  These all 
become a part of the case file, which continues to be a decisive 
tool in the judges’ arsenal after the opening of the trial, not 
merely in preparation of pre-trial.252 
The beginning of the trial phase at the ECCC is the initial 
hearing.253  At this stage, the Trial Chamber exercises broad 
management of the proceedings, and has the power to reject 
requests to summon certain witnesses where it, “considers that 
the hearing of a proposed witness or expert would not be con-
ducive to the good administration of justice.”254  This gives the 
ECCC Trial Chamber much more powers of control over the 
proceedings than is seen at the ICC and ICTY, as these rules 
allow the ECCC Trial Chamber to manage the list of witnesses 
to be called, and limit what witnesses the parties may call to 
prevent the appearance of superfluous witnesses.255  
The structure of proceedings at the ECCC follows inquisi-
torial lines.  The method of case presentation is a structural 
departure from the adversarial method most commonly seen at 
the other international courts where the full prosecution case is 
heard followed by a full defense, and the accused cannot be re-
quired to come to the stand.  Instead, at the ECCC, the case 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 See Id. Rule 80(3)(a). 
249 See Id. Rule 80(3)(b). 
250 See Id. Rule 80(3)(c). 
251 See Id. Rule 80(3)(e). 
252 See Id. Rule 87(3). 
253 See Id. Rule 80 bis (1). 
254 See Id. Rule 80 bis (2). 
255 See Id. Rule 84(1) (In order to ensure the accused his rights, in every 
instance “the Accused shall have the absolute right to summon, at the ex-
pense of the ECCC, witnesses against him or her, whom the Accused was not 
able to examine during the pre-trial stage.”)  
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/6
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begins with the Chamber calling the Co-Prosecutors to make 
an opening statement, followed by a short response from the 
defense;256 the accused is then called to the stand to allow the 
judges to hear his response to the opening by the Co-
Prosecutors.257  This is a significant departure from adversarial 
norms where the accused cannot be compelled to take the stand 
and, in further contrast to adversarial standards, the ECCC 
judge has an active duty to question the accused and to raise, 
“all pertinent questions, whether these would tend to prove or 
disprove the guilt.”258  Importantly, the accused is not permit-
ted to give sworn statements during his testimony and the 
questioning does not take the form of a sworn examination.  
The basis for this is again inquisitorial, and is premised on the 
idea that an accused should not be placed in the position of be-
ing trapped between being sworn to truthfully answer ques-
tions put before him and his right to remain silent.259  
Another unique characteristic of the procedure at the 
ECCC is that the Trial Judge takes the lead in questioning the 
accused, the witnesses, and other party participants, which is 
in line with general inquisitorial practices.260  The ECCC Trial 
Judge is the sole decision maker on the progression of the case, 
as it hears the Civil Parties, witnesses and experts in the order 
that it considers useful.261  Not only can the Trial Chamber con-
trol the order in which witnesses are heard,262 but the permis-
sion of the President is required before the parties may ask 
questions.263  Only the Co-Prosecutors and the lawyers are 
permitted to ask questions directly and all other parties, in-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 See Id. at Rule 89 bis (2). 
257 See Id. at Rule 90. 
258 See Id. at Rule 90(1): The Original Rules provided that “all the judges 
may ask any questions which they consider to be conducive to ascertaining the 
truth.  In this respect, they have a duty to raise all pertinent questions, whether 
these would tend to prove or disprove the guilt of the Accused.”; (Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules, supra note 222 at Rule 
90(1)). However, this was amended in the sixth revision to the Internal Rules, 
which eliminated the truth requirement and substituting that for the inculpatory 
and exculpatory questioning that is currently required. 
259 See ECCC Rules, supra note 222 at Rule 21(1)(d). 
260 Id. at Rule 91. 
261 Id. at Rule 91(1). 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at Rule 91(2). 
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cluding the accused and lawyers for the Civil Parties, must ask 
their questions through the President.264 The parties are per-
mitted to challenge the utility of continued testimony of a wit-
ness; however, the final decision on whether to take testimony 
lies with the President of the Trial Chamber.265   
The President of the Chamber retains overall control 
throughout proceedings by facilitating interventions by the 
other judges.266  The President also has the power, in consulta-
tion with the other judges, to, “exclude any proceedings that 
unnecessarily delay the trial, and are not conducive to ascer-
taining the truth.”267  This power is designed to ensure that 
parties do not extend the case unnecessarily by calling redun-
dant witnesses or introducing excessive documents, and has 
the effect, in essence, of permitting the President to limit the 
substance of a party’s case. 
In accordance with Rule 84(3), during the trial, each party 
may request the Chamber to hear any witnesses present in the 
courtroom who were not properly summoned to testify.268  The 
Chamber has the power to deny this request, which is open to 
appeal, but only at the same time as the Judgment of the 
Chamber on the merits.269  Again, the Chamber exercises its 
discretion in considering these requests.  This could mean that 
the Chamber has the power to directly influence a party’s case, 
as it is permitted to either allow or deny requested witness ap-
pearances.  Moreover, once a witness has been questioned, they 
remain at the disposal of the Chamber until the Chamber de-
cides his or her presence is no longer needed270 thus, allowing 
the Chamber to return to previous witnesses if it should de-
termine that more information or inquiry is required of a par-
ticular witness.  Instilling these powers in the hands of the 
judges represent a fundamental structural shift in process and 
power distribution between the parties from a pure adversarial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Id..  
265 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules 
(Rev. 8), supra note 222 at Rule 91(3). 
266 Id. at Rule 85(1). 
267 Id. at Rule 85(1). 
268 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules 
(Rev. 8), supra note 222 at Rule 84(3). 
269 Id. at Rule 84(4). 
270 Id. at Rule 91(4). 
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system, removing the structure of the case almost entirely out 
of the hands of the parties.  
Another mechanism available to the Chamber to manage 
the case is the ability of it to order additional investigations 
when it considers that new investigations are necessary.271 
These new investigations shall be carried out by a designated 
judge or judges, and operate under the same conditions as the 
OCIJ, permitting the judge to interview witnesses, conduct 
searches, seize evidence, or order expert opinions.272  
Unlike in the adversarial system and the other courts ex-
amined here, the system at the ECCC permits only the OCIJ 
and Chambers to seek expert opinions on any subject deemed 
necessary to their investigations or proceedings before the 
ECCC,273 and sets the exact parameters and duration of the as-
signment.274  Other parties may request additional experts, but 
the OCIJ and Chambers are able to reject such a request.275  
Like with the parties, the OCIJ and Chambers set time limits 
on the experts, and they can be dismissed or replaced for non-
compliance with those limits.276  Like the ordering of additional 
investigation, this allows the Judges to be fully informed of all 
aspects of the case, and to assist in their effective management 
of the case. 
Unsurprisingly, given its heavy inquisitorial influence, at 
the ECCC a dossier is an integral part of proceedings.  At the 
Court, this document collection is called the Case File. All of 
the evidence collected by the OCIJ during its investigation is 
collated into the case file, and it ultimately comprises all the 
results of the investigations,277 interviews,278 and site visits279 in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Id. at Rule 93(1). 
272 Id. at Rule 93(2)(b)–(e). 
273 Id. at Rule 31(1). 
274 Id. at Rule 31(3). 
275 Id. at Rule 31(10). 
276 Id. at Rule 31(5). The Judges may set time limits for filings of plead-
ings, written submissions and documents relating to a request or an appeal, 
unless the IRs provide otherwise. Id. at Rule 39(2). Failure to respect time 
limits shall lead to the invalidity of the action in question. Id. at Rule 39(1). 
At the request of a concerned party, the OCIJ or the Chambers may either 
extend any time limits set by them, or “recognize the validity of any action 
executed after the expiration of a time limit prescribed in these IRs on such 
terms, if any, as they see fit.” Id. at Rule 39(4). 
277 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules 
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each case.280  The case file also includes the introductory sub-
mission by the Co-Prosecutors.281    The case file becomes one of 
the central tools of the ECCC Trial Chamber, as the infor-
mation it contains permits the Court to be able to more effec-
tively utilize their powers within their expanded scope of abili-
ties to control proceedings.282   
Criticisms arise out of the fact that the judges are privy to 
all the evidence collected by the OCIJ,283 and it may seem ab-
horrent to adversarial trained lawyers, however it is a common 
feature of inquisitorial systems that rely on the professionalism 
of their judiciary in order to not be influenced.  Moreover, the 
ECCC Internal Rules attempt to dissuade bias by requiring 
that, “any decision of the Chamber shall be based only on evi-
dence that has been put before the Chamber and subjected to 
examination,”284 which means the content of the evidence at is-
sue must have been, “summarized, read out or appropriately 
identified in court.”285  Like the ICC and reformed ICTY, the 
ECCC takes a liberal approach to the admissibility of evidence, 
dispensing with formalistic rules more familiar in the adver-
sarial system, and permitting anything not against the princi-
ple of fairness.  This is another example of the international 
courts and tribunals’ reliance on inquisitorial mechanisms, and 
shifts power in favor of the judge by assuming that she will not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Rev. 8), supra note 222 at 9(5).  
278 Id. at Rule 55(7). 
279 Id. at Rule 55(8). 
280 The Case File is fundamental to the preparation of their cases by the 
Co-Prosecutor, lawyers for the Accused and the Civil Parties, as their cases 
are limited by the contents of the Case File.   
281 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules 
(Rev. 8), supra note 222 at Rule 53(2). 
282 Id at Rule 55(6); Id. at Rule 86. (The ‘Case File’ is available to both 
the prosecution and defense to enable them to build their case, and both have 
“equal access”.  In accordance with Rule 55(6) and 86 the Co-Prosecutors and 
lawyers for the other parties shall have “the right to examine and make cop-
ies of the case file under the supervision of the Greffier of the Co-
Investigating Judges, during working days and subject to the requirements of 
the proper functioning of the ECCC”). 
283 By having access to all the evidence it is a concern that the Judges 
may developed pre conceived opinions on the case, the direction it should pro-
gress and the potential outcome.   
284 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules at 
Rule 87(2). 
285 Id. at Rule 87(3). 
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allow herself to be swayed by biased evidence in drawing a 
finding on the basis of facts presented before the court. 
Given its origins, it is unsurprising that the ECCC is the 
court with the most features closely aligned with the pure in-
quisitorial model., but it is particularly noteworthy that it is 
not entirely inquisitorial in practice.  Indeed, the ECCC has 
come to embrace certain adversarial practices.  The following 
section will examine each of the three courts discussed above 
and identify how converge around similar mechanisms.  It will 
also identify where upon the scale between adversarial and in-
quisitorial practices each court falls. 
V. THE PROCEDURAL SPECTRUM: SIMILARITIES, DIFFERENCE 
AND CONVERGENCES IN ICP 
As we can see from the foregoing analysis of the proce-
dures at the ICTY, ICC and ECCC, each one has, to some ex-
tent, moved away from the adversarial origins of ICP found at 
Nuremberg,286 and instead, adopted inquisitorial methods and 
processes into its procedure. None of the three courts and tri-
bunals have entirely forefeited the adversarial system in favor 
of a pure inquisitorial system, but rather, each court has 
adopted a compromise, drawing on mechanisms and procedural 
devices from both pure traditions, so that none of the formula-
tions of ICP found at these three courts can be said to exactly 
embody either of the pure models.   
The tracing of procedural developments in ICP shows sev-
eral sui generis developments in international law.287  This Lat-
in maxim, meaning “of its own kind,”288 is aptly applied to a 
procedural system that blends elements of the two traditions 
into a unified system.  That the three courts and tribunals have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 Jackson, supra note 7; Goran Sluiter, Law of International Criminal 
Procedure and Domestic War Crimes Trials, The, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 605 
(2006); Megret, supra note 3; The Structure of International Criminal Proce-
dure, supra note 1; Langer, supra note 6.   
287 Colin B. Picker, International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil 
Law Jurisdiction, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1083 (2008); Patrick L. Robin-
son, Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Proceedings at the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 569–589 (2000). 
288 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/193700 
(last accessed Apr. 28, 2014). 
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adopted different approaches to this blending renders it incor-
rect to think of the entire body of ICP as sui generis.  Rather, 
we should think of each international court as embracing its 
own sui generis model of procedure, as each court has achieved 
the amalgamation of the two traditions differently to come to 
rest at a position on the spectrum of procedure between the two 
pure models.  However, in highlighting the difference between 
procedures adopted vis-à-vis the three courts, it is interesting 
to note that there are several convergences on similar methods 
of procedure or procedural devices. 
As suggested in Part I(c), we can think about the space be-
tween the pure adversarial and pure inquisitorial models as 
embracing a spectrum, or sliding scale, between the two ex-
tremes of each system, and Part V will now discuss where upon 
this spectrum each of the international courts and tribunals 
under discussion falls.  This article asserts that ICP as a body 
of procedure is characterized by shifting power dynamics be-
tween the actors in the system and so it is through an exami-
nation of how this power shift has occurred at each court that 
we can identify where on the procedural spectrum it lies.  It is 
suggested that these altered power dynamics are most pro-
nounced in relation to the role of the judge in international 
criminal proceedings, which implicates upon the other parties 
and commands the use of specific procedural devices. 
In order to illuminate where on the procedural scale each 
court rests, this article will now compare the similarities and 
differences of the procedure of each court, which, when exam-
ined side by side, will assist us is highlighting where on the 
procedural scale each court is situated.  This section will look 
at the extent to which we see dynamic transfers in procedural 
culture across the three courts in two particular areas, (a) 
structural shifts and (b) the use of specific procedural devices.  
The structural changes in power distribution between the par-
ties are most usefully illuminated by looking at three stages of 
the proceedings: (i) the investigatory process; (ii) discretion in 
determining charges and; (iii) pre- and during-trial functions of 
the parties.  From this examination, it quickly becomes evident 
that under the system of ICP, as a whole, the judge is signifi-
cantly more empowered than under a pure adversarial system; 
however, as will be shown, the specific functions of the judicial 
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss2/6
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organs across the three courts exhibit little uniformity and ac-
tually rest at different points on the spectrum between the 
pure adversarial and inquisitorial models. Underlining all the-
se structural shifts are two procedural devices: (i) the use of a 
dossier or case file and (ii) broad rules of evidence, within 
which we see broad usage convergence across the three courts 
but, again, not identical application.  The fact that there is not 
precise uniformity between the courts in how these power 
shifts have been enacted is not fatal to the analysis of the de-
velopment of ICP. Both areas where the courts differ in their 
mechanisms and where there are striking similarities but 
achieved by different outcomes are equally illuminating for an 
exploration of the growth of ICP. 
As was established in Part I, under a pure adversarial sys-
tem, the function of the judge is to be a “passive umpire”, 289 
acting independently290 and relying on comprehensive rules of 
evidence 291 to adjudge the legal issues arising in a case, and to 
deliver a sentence based on a lay jury finding of fact.  Converse-
ly, the inquisitorial judge is part of the “investigating offi-
cial”,292 with the power to actively pursue independent lines of 
investigation. 293 The judge relies heavily on a dossier, compris-
ing all of the procedural stages in the case,294 and has no use for 
comprehensive rules of evidence.295 The judge has the power to 
make a decision on both the facts and the law.296  What we see 
in the development of ICP, both structurally and in the imple-
mentation of specific procedural devices, is a strong move away 
from passivity in the judicial body found under an adversarial 
system towards a much more active involvement of the judges 
at all stages of proceedings.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 Langer, supra note 6, at 840; Walpin, supra note 32, at 176; Damaska, 
Uncertain Fate, supra note 6, at 850.   
290 Orie, supra note 33, at 1427. 
291 CASSESE, supra note 15, at 374. 
292 DAMASKA, supra note 62, at 26; Van Kessel, supra note 48, at 800–801. 
293 Lerner, supra note 19, at 802; Goldstein, supra note 13, at 1018. 
294 Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 14, at 533. 
295 Orie, supra note 33, at 1452; Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 47, at 7. 
296 Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 47, at 7. 
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a. Structural Shifts  
i. The Investigatory Process  
The area where we first see fundamental power shifts 
away from pure adversarial norms is in relation to the investi-
gatory process.  Under a pure adversarial system, following ini-
tial investigation by the police,297 both the prosecution and de-
fense are equipped with equal powers of investigation,298 and 
the judge does not interfere with that investigatory phase.299  
Conversely, in a pure inquisitorial system, that investigatory 
power lies with the investigating official,300 who can be either 
an investigating judge or a combination of both prosecution and 
judiciary,301 whose involvement is commanded from the mo-
ment a crime is reported.302  Across the three international 
courts, to varying degrees, we see increasing involvement of 
judges during the investigation stage – from zero at the ICTY 
to sole judicial conduct at the ECCC.  Indeed, it is at this stage 
in international criminal proceedings that we see the broadest 
procedural arc between the two pure models, with each of the 
courts falling at a different point on the spectrum between the 
two.  
At the ICTY both the prosecutor and defense retain a large 
measure of the equality afforded them under a pure adversari-
al system.  Akin to the adversarial system, there is no judicial 
involvement in the investigation stage; the prosecutor is re-
sponsible for all initial investigation, and is able to summon 
and question suspects, witnesses and victims, and collect their 
statements, as well as, collect evidence and conduct onsite in-
vestigations.303  Once an indictment has been issued, the de-
fense is empowered, and indeed obligated to the client, to con-
duct its own investigation.  The ICTY OTP is not obliged to 
investigate exculpatory evidence on behalf of the defense; how-	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299 CASSESE, supra note 15, at 373. 
300 Lerner, supra note 19, at 802; Goldstein, supra note 13, at 1018. 
301 Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 47; Goldstein, supra note 13, at 1019; 
Damaska, Uncertain Fate, supra note 6, at 843. 
302 SAFFERLING, supra note 8 at 54–55. 
303 ICTY RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, supra note 102, at Rule 39. 
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ever, they do have a duty to disclose to the Defense “any mate-
rial which in the actual knowledge of the prosecutor may sug-
gest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or affect 
the credibility of prosecution evidence.”304  Conversely, at the 
ICC, the OTP is required to play a role more akin to the inquis-
itorial official investigator, with the goal of establishing the 
truth. 305   In doing so, the prosecutor has many investigatory 
techniques at her disposal, including collecting and examining 
evidence and interviewing suspects, witnesses and victims.306 
The prosecutor has a duty to investigate both “incriminating 
and exonerating circumstances equally,”307 much like the role of 
an investigating official in the pure inquisitorial system.  De-
fense Counsel at the ICC also has independent powers of inves-
tigation like that at the ICTY, and can be assisted by the Reg-
istrar in certain circumstances.308  The ECCC embraces an 
entirely inquisitorial approach to investigation, instilling in the 
Office of the Co-Investigating Judges all investigatory pow-
ers,309 but within the confines set out by the Co-Prosecutor’s in 
its introductory submission. 310  Like the official investigator 
under the pure inquisitorial system, the OCIJ is tasked with 
investigating all inculpatory and exculpatory evidence and 
must conduct an impartial investigation, conducive to deter-
mining the truth311 and, as such, is able to determine which 
crime sites to investigate, what evidence to collect and which 
witnesses to interview.312  The defense does not conduct its own 
investigation, instead making requests of the OCIJ to do so on 
its behalf, which it is able to reject, subject to appeal.313 
We can conclude from this that in the investigatory stages 
there have been dynamic power shifts in two of the courts that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Id. at Rule 68. These disclosure obligations are limited by the excep-
tions contained in Rule 70. 
305 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 
139, art. 54(1)(a). 
306 Id. at Rule 54(3)(a)–(f). 
307 Id. at Article 54(1)(a). 
308 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, supra note 143 at Rule 20(1)(b). 
309 ECCC Internal Rules, Rule 55 (rev. 8) (Aug. 3, 2011). 
310 Id. at rules 55(2), 53. 
311 Id. at rule 55(5). 
312 Id. at rule 55(5)(a)–(d). 
313 Id. at rule 55(10). 
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have increased the control that the judge has over the investi-
gation. The court that has retained procedure closest to the ad-
versarial roots of ICP is the ICTY with the bulk of initial inves-
tigatory power resting with the prosecutor.314 In this way, at 
the ICTY, the investigation is still molded around an adversar-
ial competition, as the prosecution zealously investigates 
whether there is a case to answer and uncovers facts that sup-
port that case, with the defense doing the same once the ac-
cused is indicted.  Conversely, both the ICC315 and ECCC316 
have moved towards the inquisitorial end of the spectrum and 
have adopted mechanisms more familiar to such a system, em-
phasizing the role of the investigating official to identify excul-
patory, as well as, inculpatory evidence to further the inquisi-
torial goal of determining the truth.317   
There is one readily evident anomaly in the investigation 
stages that models neither the adversarial nor inquisitorial 
models; that is the sui generis development at the ICC of utiliz-
ing a judicial body, the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC), in an author-
ization and review capacity to determine the power of the pros-
ecutor to conduct its investigations.318  This models neither the 
adversarial system, where the decision to proceed with a case 
rests in the hands of the prosecutor, nor the inquisitorial sys-
tem, where it lies in the hands of the official investigator. In 
that sense, the ICC procedure goes beyond the spectrum be-
tween the pure adversarial and pure inquisitorial systems, and 
this PTC function can be seen as an outlier, falling beyond the 
realms of the spectrum highlighted in Part I(c). 
iii. Discretion in Charging  
Once the investigation stages are over, more shifts in pow-
er distribution are evident in relation to which party exercises 
discretion in charging an accused.  In the pure adversarial sys-
tem, this is in the sole purview of the prosecutor;319 yet, no-
where across these three courts is that power left in those 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 ICTY RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, supra note 102 at Rule 39. 
315 ROME STATUTE, art. 54(1)(a), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9. 
316 ECCC Internal Rules, Rule 55 (rev. 8) (Aug. 3, 2011). 
317 Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 47, at 7. 
318 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT at Rule 53. 
319 CASSESE, supra note 15 at 367. 
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hands alone and instead, a judicial entity is called upon to dif-
fering extents.  At the ICTY, which is the system that still most 
closely aligns with the adversarial model, the prosecutor’s in-
dictment is reviewed by a judge who must confirm whether 
there is a prima facie case to answer320 before issuing an arrest 
warrant for an accused.321  At the ICC, a confirmation of charg-
es hearing is held before the Pre-Trial Chamber and the PTC 
must determine, “whether there is sufficient evidence to estab-
lish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed 
each of the crimes charged.”322  In both instances, the reviewing 
judge can confirm, dismiss, or request further information,323 
but judicial approval is required in both court systems before 
an indictment can be issued.  The procedure at the ECCC dif-
fers from the ICTY and ICC in that it does not require further 
judicial approval beyond the OCIJ’s decision to charge; howev-
er, the OCIJ is limited in this regard to those named in the Co-
Prosecutor’s Introductory Submissions.324  The OCIJ’s func-
tionality is as the official investigator at the ECCC, which is a 
direct inquisitorial construct, and helps explain why there is 
not a requirement of a second level of judicial review once the 
judicial body, the OCIJ, has made its determinations. 
Again, from this stage of the proceedings, we can once 
again see a stark and deliberate move away from pure adver-
sarial mechanisms in ICP, towards more involvement of the ju-
diciary, familiar to an inquisitorial model.  This is another ex-
ample of shifting power dynamics in favor of the judges, and is 
indicative of a move across the spectrum of procedure from a 
pure adversarial system to a more inquisitorial one.  The ICC 
confirmation of charges hearing, for example, is derived from 
inquisitorial procedure,325 as is the ECCC Office of Co-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 ICTY RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, supra note 102 at Rule 
47(E). 
321 Id. at Rule 47(H). 
322 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 140 
at Article 61(7)(emphasis added). 
323 ICTY RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, supra note 102 at Rule 
47(E); ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 140 
at Rule 61(7). 
324 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules 
(Rev. 8), supra note 222 at Rule 55(4). 
325 Kress, supra note 1 at 610. 
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Investigating Judges.326  In particular, it is interesting to see 
that the ICTY also swings in favor of more inquisitorially influ-
enced mechanisms at this stage in the procedure than it has 
done in the investigation stage.327  This helps to highlight that 
each of the three courts have chosen to embrace inquisitorial 
mechanisms to different extents, and that the extent to which 
they have moved towards inquisitorialism is not uniform across 
all stages, even within a single court system.  
iv. Pre-and During-Trial Party Roles 
The phases of proceedings where the altered role of the 
judge moves away from a passive umpire is most evident dur-
ing pre-trial and trial processes.  At each court, the judge is 
furnished with increased procedural powers that allow her to 
command more control over proceedings and the formation of 
the case than would ever be permissible under a pure adversar-
ial system.; however, the extent to which each individual court 
system has embraced this shift in power dynamics continues to 
differ.   
Again, the system where we see the least power shift from 
a pure adversarial framework is at the ICTY.  Throughout its 
early years, the ICTY was almost entirely reliant on more tra-
ditional adversarial role assignments,328 but during subsequent 
revisions to the ICTY RPEs we witness an increasing move-
ment towards more inquisitorial roles for the judge,329  Howev-
er, even powers which could be indicative of a more inquisitori-
al persuasion, such as, the ability of the judge to limit the 
number of crime sites, witnesses called, and evidence produced, 
actually have their origins in the desire of the tribunal to expe-
dite proceedings.  Indeed, the reforms that took place were an 
attempt by the ICTY to give the judges more control over as-
sisting the parties in progressing the case to trial,330 rather 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 Lerner, supra note 19 at 802; Goldstein, supra note 13 at 1018. 
327 ICTY RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, supra note 102 at Rule 
47(E). 
328 Langer, supra note 3 at 838. 
329 Id. at 868.  
330 Id.; Langer and Doherty, supra note 3. In fact, Langer suggests that 
these reforms are better categorized as instilling “managerial powers” in the 
ICTY judiciary. 
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than a deliberate move towards procedural hybridization. In 
comparison, the Trial Chamber at the ECCC wields enormous 
inquisitorial power, such that, they may dictate the progression 
of the entire case, with the President having the power to di-
rect the order of proceedings, the order in which witnesses are 
called, and to take the lead in questioning.331  The ICC falls 
somewhere in the middle of the ICTY and ECCC, as there, the 
Trial Judge is responsible for more management functions akin 
to the ICTY Trial Chamber. But, the Pre Trial Chamber plays 
a much more inquisitorially influenced role;332  however, by vir-
tue of roles and functions for the Pre Trial and Trial Chambers, 
the ICC remains closer to the inquisitorial end of the spectrum 
than the ICTY. 
b. Procedural Devices  
The structural power shifts we see across the three courts 
and tribunals are underlined by the introduction of two proce-
dural devices that display an inquisitorial preference: (i) the 
use of a dossier, and (ii) a preference against formal rules of ev-
idence in favor of broad admissibility, and there is much con-
vergence and uniformity in the application of these procedural 
devices across the ICTY, ICC, and ECCC.  
i. The Dossier  
Each court examined here has employed the use of a dossi-
er, or case file, comparable to the traditional inquisitorial de-
vice used to collate all information relating to a case.333  Alien 
to adversarially trained lawyers, the requirement of a compre-
hensive file of all investigations and proceedings has been 
transplanted into ICP and has become crucial in furtherance of 
the judges exercising all their expanded powers appropriately.  
Having all the relevant documentation assembled together al-
lows the judge access to the intricacies of the case and provides 
them with sufficient knowledge to permit them to make deci-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules 
(Rev. 8), supra note 222 at Rule 91. 
332 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, supra note 143 at Rule 121(2)(b). 
333 Damaska, supra note 14 at 533. 
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sions regarding all elements of proceedings.334  That this in-
quisitorial procedural device has found traction is hardly sur-
prising if we consider the scope of information the court must 
deal with when dealing with an international crimes case; 
however, despite choosing to embrace this inquisitorial device, 
there remain differences across the courts on how they have 
elected to compile this file, and what is included in and exclud-
ed from it.     
Again, it is at the ECCC that we see the most similarities 
with the traditional inquisitorial device. The Case File at the 
ECCC records all information pertaining to the case335 thus, 
playing an identical role as the inquisitorial dossier.336  In con-
trast, the ICTY file337 and ICC Registrar compiled record338 do 
not emulate the true inquisitorial dossier entirely, as both of 
those courts use their file to collect information from pre-trial 
forward only (excluding the investigatory documents which are 
traditionally a crucial part of the inquisitorial dossier). 
Although the three courts have not embraced the concept 
of a dossier identically, the mere introduction of a type of case 
file into each of the three courts indicates a broad convergence 
between them, providing the judge with more information to 
enable her to exercise her broader powers more effectively.  In 
this regard, despite the differences in methods of compilation, 
the use of a case file or dossier is indicative of a move towards 
inquisitorialism across the three courts, and highlights the 
preference for the inquisitorial end of the spectrum within ICP.  
ii. Rules of Evidence: Broad Admissibility  
A similar convergence can be seen when we examine the 
rules of evidence used across the three courts, as all have cho-
sen to dispense with detailed rules of evidence in line with in-
quisitorial practices.339  Both the ICTY and ICC adopt almost 
identical standards for admission, permitting anything that is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 MUELLER AND POOLE-GRIFFITHS, supra note 61 at 7. 
335 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules 
(Rev. 8), supra note 22 at Rule 55(6); Id. at Rule 86.   
336 MUELLER AND POOLE-GRIFFITHS, supra note 61 at 7. 
337 ICTY RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, supra note 102 at Rule 
65ter(L)(i)–(ii). 
338 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, supra note 143 at Rule 15. 
339 Orie, supra note 33 at 1452; Pizzi and Marafioti, supra note 47 at 7. 
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probative and not prejudicial to a fair trial or the fair evalua-
tion of the testimony of a witness.340  The ECCC Rules provide 
that, “all evidence is admissible”,341 with the conditions that de-
cisions must be made based on evidence that has been put be-
fore the Chamber and subjected examination,342 and that the 
Chamber must be convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond 
a reasonable doubt.343 
Informal rules of evidence are an inquisitorial mechanism 
that goes to the heart of the goal of determining the truth in 
the inquisitorial system.344  It is significant that all three courts 
have shifted away from the adversarial preference for detailed 
rules of evidence345 in favor of the inquisitorial end of the pro-
cedural spectrum, as it assumes that professional judges are 
capable of determining what is or is not prejudicial to the out-
come of the case, which is again evidence in a shift in the power 
distribution away from adversarial norms. 
As we can see, while the ICTY, ICC, and ECCC have all 
embraced procedural shifts away from traditional adversarial 
norms at all phases of the case, none of them have done so 
identically.  Figure 2 (below) outlines the differences and helps 
to illuminate where on the procedural spectrum each court 
falls, between the pure adversarial and pure inquisitorial mod-
els at either end. 
Figure 2 – The Procedural Spectrum – Convergences, 
Similarities and Differences Across the Courts 
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Adversarial 
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340 ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 140 
at Article 69(4); ICTY RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, supra note 102 at 
Rule 89(C)–(D). 
341 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules 
(Rev. 8), supra note 222 at Rule 87(1). 
342 Id. at Rule 87(2). 
343 Id. at Rule 87(1). 
344 Pizzi and Marafioti, supra note 47 at 7. 
345 CASSESE, supra note 15 at 374; Orie, supra note 33 at 1428, 1451. 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
As we can see from figure 2, while international criminal 
procedure has taken on various adversarial and inquisitorial 
iterations, individual to each court, there are broad conver-
gences around the preference for employing increasing inquisi-
torially influenced mechanisms and procedural devices.  In em-
bracing this convergence, each court adopts an individual 
procedure that combines elements of the two distinct pure 
models and blends them into a unified system specific to that 
court.  Although each court has blended the two models differ-
ently, that blend is characterized by a shift in power distribu-
tion, and we can identify a pattern that illuminates the prefer-
ence for increased inquisitorial style of judicial powers at all 
phases of proceedings.   
The foregoing comparisons show us that, perhaps unsur-
prisingly given its origins within a domestic inquisitorial sys-
tem, the ECCC is the system that most closely mirrors an in-
quisitorial procedure, while the ICTY remains the closest to 
adversarialism, particularly with regard to the investigatory 
powers of the prosecution and defense.  The ICC falls between 
the two, adopting some measures of inquisitorialism, while re-
taining some adversarial influences. 
It is important to note that ICP should not be categorized 
as trying to entirely escape its adversarial origins.  True, the 
initially adversarial ICTY system has succeeded in incorporat-
ing more inquisitorial elements into its procedure, however, 
that court has not sought to adopt an entirely inquisitorial sys-
tem. At the same time as adopting inquisitorial mechanisms, 
the court has also retained mechanisms common to the adver-
sarial tradition.  Each of the courts under analysis have 
reached a unique compromise of adversarial and inquisitorial 
mechanisms, with no two having adopted identical characteris-
tics; however, that they have all converged upon the same form 
of power distribution serves as a pattern to analyze procedural 
development.  The similarities across the international courts 
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and tribunals highlight a new type of procedure: one that ex-
tracts the most valuable elements of procedure from both tradi-
tions and marries them into a single structure, and that new 
procedure significantly empowers the judge at all phases of 
proceedings. 
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